Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2012

A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History
by the Rules
Victoria Nourse
Georgetown Law Center, vfn@law.georgetown.edu

Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-150

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1096
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2161858

122 Yale L.J. 70-152 (2012)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Legal History Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Political
Theory Commons

70.NOURSE.152.DOC

10/11/2012 3:24:36 PM

Victoria F. Nourse

A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation:
Legislative History by the Rules
abstract. We have a law of civil procedure, criminal procedure, and administrative
procedure, but we have no law of legislative procedure. This failure has serious consequences in
the field of statutory interpretation. Using simple rules garnered from Congress itself, this
Article argues that those rules are capable of transforming the field of statutory interpretation.
Addressing canonical cases in the field, from Holy Trinity to Bock Laundry, from Weber to Public
Citizen, this Article shows how cases studied by vast numbers of law students are made
substantially more manageable, and in some cases quite simple, through knowledge of
congressional procedure. No longer need legislative history always be a search for one’s friends.
Call this a decision theory of statutory interpretation. This approach is based on how
Congress does in fact make decisions and thus is a positive theory. Normatively, it has the
advantage of privileging text without blinding judges either to relevant information or to their
duty to implement Congress’s decisions, including Congress’s own decisionmaking methods. It
may also have the side benefit of reducing legislative incentives to manipulate the rules or to
engage in strategic behavior to induce particular statutory interpretations.
author. Professor of Law and Director, Center for Congressional Studies, Georgetown
University Law Center. Special thanks to Professor William Eskridge’s seminar on Theories of
Statutory Interpretation at Yale Law School, and Professor Peter Strauss’s The Regulatory State
course at Columbia Law School, for their students’ enthusiasm and critical reflections on this
Article. Thanks as well to the many faculty who commented on this Article at workshops at
Georgetown, Northwestern, and the Yale Supreme Court Advocacy Clinic. Special thanks go to
Dean Daniel Rodriguez, Professor Tonja Jacobi, and Professor Kathy Zeiler for their special
advice on positive political theory, and to Professor Chai Feldblum for her willingness to teach
these ideas to federal judges. Finally, the staff of The Yale Law Journal provided excellent editing
suggestions, for which I am most grateful. All errors are of course my own.
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introduction
Legislative history’s fires still burn, despite repeated attempts to extinguish
them. The Supreme Court and the courts of appeals routinely invoke legislative
history when statutory text is ambiguous.1 Even textualists2 suggest that
legislative history might be consulted to determine Congress’s meanings in
cases of apparent absurdity. Since neither scholars nor lawyers dispute that, as
a matter of fact, legislative history is used, the question is how it is best used.
More than occasionally, law professors reveal a stunning lack of knowledge
about Congress’s rules. This reflects the failure of the standard law school
curriculum, with its courses on civil procedure, criminal procedure, and
administrative procedure, but none on legislative procedure.3 Perhaps not

1.

2.

3.
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Legislative history, whether followed or not, has featured in some of the more prominent
controversies of the day, from the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, see Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 425 (4th Cir. 2011), abrogated by Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), cert. denied, No. 11-438, 2012 WL
2470099 (U.S. June 29, 2012), to the National Football League player lockout, see Brady v.
Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 678-80 (8th Cir. 2011). A Westlaw search conducted on
September 16, 2011 in the “U.S. Courts of Appeals Cases” database for the term “legislative
history” at least five times in a single case resulted in over 5,000 appellate cases; at least four
times yielded over 7,000 cases; and at least three times yielded over 10,000 cases (in a database
retrieving cases since 1891). It would thus be quite premature and unwise for lawyers not to
learn, cite, or be prepared to rebut claims drawn from legislative history. For recent
examples of courts invoking legislative history, see DePierre v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2225,
2234-35 (2011); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1081-82 (2011); Los Angeles County
v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447, 451-52 (2010); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Recovery
Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 652 F.3d 122, 127-28 (1st Cir. 2011); and Cohen v. United States,
650 F.3d 717, 729-30 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“I think it entirely appropriate to consult all public materials, including . . . the
legislative history of [Rule 609(a)(1)’s] adoption, to verify that what seems to us an
unthinkable disposition . . . was indeed unthought of . . . .”); James J. Brudney,
Confirmatory Legislative History, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 901 (2011) (discussing the Roberts
Court’s current confirmatory use of legislative history); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear,
Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117 (2008) (identifying an overall decline in legislative history
but providing empirical data showing that the Court continues to use legislative history).
As Judge Posner long ago complained: “[T]he creation and interpretation of statutes are
now paramount concerns of the legal profession. . . . But about the nature of the legislative
process . . . the typical law school curriculum is practically silent.” Richard A. Posner, Book
Review, 74 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1567 (1988) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P.
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY (1988)) (emphasis added). While theories of statutory interpretation have flourished
since this statement, it remains the case that focus on congressional process is rare if not
nonexistent in the legal academy.

a decision theory of statutory interpretation

surprisingly then, the average lawyer learns to read the congressional record in
ways he or she would never read a judicial opinion or trial record. No lawyer
would confuse a dissent with a majority opinion, or pleadings with jury
instructions, and yet the equivalent occurs regularly in standard judicial and
scholarly legislative histories. Scholars and law students dismantle
congressional reports and debates as if early reports (at the pleading stage)
were interchangeable with much-altered bills (jury instructions) and as if
statements of those who lost the debate (dissenting opinions) amount to
authoritative statements of meaning (majority opinions). Such readings invite
legislative history’s critics to shout “activism.” But, as we will see, there is a
better and more objective way to understand legislative history: by the rules.
In this Article, I offer a decision theory4 of statutory interpretation that
aims to make the reading of legislative history empirically sound, normatively
appealing, and far easier, because it defers to Congress’s own rules.5 Legislative
history by the rules is likely to appear as common sense to those who have
actually worked in a legislature, but few persons on the bench or in the legal

4.

5.

The terms “decision theory” and “rule-based decision theory” are used interchangeably in
this Article. It is important to note, particularly for political scientists, that the term
“decision theory” has been used in other contexts far different from the way it is used here.
For example, this Article does not offer a welfarist, cost-benefit analysis of decisionmaking.
See Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1574 (2010) (characterizing Adrian Vermeule’s theory as an
“institutional choice” welfarist approach); Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation and Decision
Theory, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 329 (2007) (reviewing ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006)) (describing
Vermeule’s cost-benefit approach as a “decision theory”). Nor is this Article’s approach
associated with the heuristics movement or behavioral decision theory. See Samuel
Issacharoff, Behavioral Decision Theory in the Court of Public Law, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 671
(2002). Rule-based decision theory is a positive political theory in the sense that it reflects
empirical realities about how Congress works. For a more careful distinction between rulebased decision theory and other forms of positive political theory, see infra Part IV.
You will find related ideas occasionally strewn about the professional literature but never
theorized as such. See, e.g., Larry M. Eig & Yule Kim, Statutory Interpretation: General
Principles and Recent Trends, in STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS; STATUTORY STRUCTURE AND LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING
CONVENTIONS; DRAFTING FEDERAL GRANTS STATUTES; AND TRACKING CURRENT FEDERAL
LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS 1, 45 (TheCapitol.Net ed., 2010) (suggesting that temporal
proximity and relevance rules can trump the standard hierarchy of legislative history). A
welcome exception to ignorance of congressional procedure is Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A.
Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573 (2008), which
assesses the influence of congressional resolutions that do not have the status of law. This
Article deals with a far greater range of congressional actions, including those having the
status of law.
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academy have such experience.6 As political scientists generally believe,
legislative rules help Congress achieve stability and equilibrium in an otherwise
chaotic atmosphere.7 As even those skeptical of legislative history have
explained, these rules are “‘second nature’ in our political culture”; in effect,
they are Congress’s constitution.8 As legislative scholars have long known,
“without a positive theory,” any normative theory of statutory interpretation
may be misguided and even futile.9
Those who scoff at legislative “intent” should read on. Let us agree that the
anthropomorphic metaphor portraying Congress as a single person misleads.
When it comes to the judiciary, lawyers understand this: they do not charge
the multimember Supreme Court with having no “intent” and, from this
premise, dismiss judicial opinions as if the Court had made no decision. Firstyear law students easily recognize the difference between majority and

6.

7.

8.
9.
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Both scholars and judges have noted their concern that lawyers lack sufficient experience or
knowledge of congressional practice to fully understand legislative history. See ADRIAN
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION 113 (2006) (questioning whether parties and judges “lack the
comprehensive background knowledge of the legislative process necessary to assess the
significance and weight of the sources”); Robert A. Katzmann, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.
637, 645 (2012) (“[T]here has been scant consideration given to what I think is critical as
courts discharge their interpretative task—an appreciation of how Congress actually
functions.”); see also Dakota S. Rudesill, Closing the Legislative Experience Gap: How a
Legislative Law Clerk Program Will Benefit the Legal Profession and Congress, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 699, 706-08 (2010) (providing an empirical study showing a “virtual non-existence of
legislative work experience” among judges and top legal faculty members). There are of
course well-known exceptions to the rule of judicial inexperience in legislatures, such as
Justice Stephen Breyer, Judge Robert A. Katzmann, and former Judge Abner Mikva.
KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 374
(2d ed. 2010) (arguing that “[p]rocedures are required to cut through all this instability,”
given that “there is no equilibrium to majority voting”); see Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional
Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 27, 27
(1979) (offering a model of legislative behavior that results in “equilibrium”); Kenneth A.
Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions, in POSITIVE
THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS 5, 7 (Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast
eds., 1995). Although the statutory interpretation literature often emphasizes Arrow’s
Theorem, see infra note 72, which predicts that Congress, when faced with multiple
alternatives, cannot reach a coherent policy choice, few political scientists accept this theory
as consistent with empirical reality. Legislative rules and institutions permit coherent policy
choices. Second-generation textualism has moved away from this line of attack, as Professor
Manning has argued. See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1287, 1315 (2010) (“Second-generation textualism seems to embrace the legislative process,
with all its foibles.”).
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 77 (1999).
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 123, 152 (1989).

a decision theory of statutory interpretation

dissenting opinions. Yet the simple distinction between winners and losers
appears to have sporadic influence on standard judicial use of legislative
history.10 Untutored in basic legislative distinctions, judges and scholars
cannot differentiate between reliable history and biased or manufactured
history, precisely the abuse textualists decry.
Congress makes decisions within a set of endogenous rules.11 These rules
can be used to cull the wheat from the chaff of legislative history; in fact, they
can even be used to support claims about the centrality of key texts. This should
be good news for lawyers and judges because this approach may simplify the
process of analyzing and identifying relevant legislative history. For textualists,
a decision theory may help identify central texts in cases where texts conflict,
and, for purposivists, it may strengthen and objectify their legislative history
arguments. It should also be good news for positive political theorists who
have claimed, for over a decade, that existing theories of statutory
interpretation—including textualism—lack an approach that appreciates “how
legislation is actually created and how elected officials” operate.12

10.

11.

12.

See infra Section II.D (arguing that reliance on losers’ history—statements of those who
opposed a bill—is equivalent to confusing a dissenting for a majority opinion). To be sure,
there are statements by courts that “[t]he fears and doubts of the opposition are no
authoritative guide to the construction of legislation.” Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394 (1950). And yet this advice, as we will see later, is often
acknowledged but rejected. For example, there are courts that, noting this injunction,
nevertheless draw meaning from losers’ history explicitly. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Gov’t
Emps. v. Gates, 486 F.3d 1316, 1325-26 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing losers’ statements for the
proposition that a last-minute conference committee change was a “statutory elephant (in
the sense of having a huge impact)”); see also text accompanying notes 152-154 (discussing
this phenomenon in United Steelworkers v. Weber); infra note 219 and accompanying text
(discussing this phenomenon in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.); infra note 218 (listing other
cases).
The House and Senate rules can be easily found online. Karen L. Haas, Rules of the House of
Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (Jan. 5, 2011), http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf;
Rules of the Senate, COMMITTEE ON RULES & ADMIN., U.S. SENATE, http://www.rules.senate
.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RulesOfSenateHome (last visited Mar. 27, 2012). It is important
to note that the term “rules” as used in this Article refers to the standing rules of the House
and Senate cited above, not to specific “rules” created for the debate of particular legislation.
McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 5 (1994) [hereinafter McNollgast, Intent]; see McNollgast,
Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705,
741 (1992) [hereinafter McNollgast, Positive Canons]; Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R.
Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207,
1219-22 (2007) [hereinafter Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox]; Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry
R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964
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Part I of this Article argues that we must move beyond the great debates
about abstract questions of legislative intent, and turn to Congress’s own rules.
The realist critique of legislative intent as a fiction has been a diversion. No one
looks for the nine-Justice Supreme Court’s intent in determining the meaning
of a judicial decision, and no one need look for the fictional intent of Congress
in searching for the meaning of its decisions. The term “legislative intent” is
obscuring, even for those of us who consider ourselves “originalists” in matters
of statutory interpretation. Intent is simply a constitutional heuristic used to
remind judges that, in the end, it is not their decision, but Congress’s.13
Legislative intent, then, is not an accurate description of Congress, but a
message for judges about judging. This Part concludes by explaining how rulebased decision theory is far more realistic and empirically grounded than either
textualism or purposivism as a method of statutory interpretation.
Part II offers five rule-based decision theory Principles,14 akin to canons, for
judges and lawyers to make readings of legislative history more objective. The
First Principle is a caution against congressional illiteracy: one should never
read legislative history without knowing Congress’s rules. To illustrate, I use
Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice15 to show how the rules of conference
committees could have simplified this important Supreme Court case,
eliminating the difficulties preoccupying the Justices about the absurdity
doctrine or the Appointments Clause.
The Second Principle is a rule of reverse sequential consideration:
legislative history should focus on the last relevant legislative decision. To
illustrate, I invoke two canonical cases, United Steelworkers v. Weber16 and Green
v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,17 and I argue that both liberal and conservative

13.
14.

15.
16.
17.
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Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1442-48 (2003) [hereinafter
Rodriguez & Weingast, New Perspectives].
See JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 32-33 (1982).
These Principles are intended to be just that—canons for judicial or agency interpretation—
not attempts to enforce Congress’s rules as such. Courts have no competence to look behind
Congress’s texts to impose “rule-based” objections to Congress’s lawmaking procedures.
The point of these Principles is to use them to resolve textual ambiguities in a way that a
member of Congress, following the rules, would resolve those ambiguities. In this sense,
they are similar to the canons asserted by positive political theorists. See, e.g., McNollgast,
Positive Canons, supra note 12. Because two of these Principles are in fact “meta-canons” (see
the First Principle and Fifth Principle), I have chosen to use the term “principle,” which
encompasses both the more general and the more specific recommendations.
491 U.S. 440 (1989).
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
490 U.S. 504 (1989).

a decision theory of statutory interpretation

Justices have made serious errors in reading legislative history precisely
because they have failed to understand congressional procedure.
The Third Principle is one of proximity and specificity: proximity to text
and specificity to the interpretive issue are central to the most reliable history.
This rule of relevance can make manageable even some of the largest
decisionmaking records, including the vast legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Here, I use as illustration the three-page legislative history
of the Tower amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, at issue in the
controversial disparate impact decision Griggs v. Duke Power Co.18
The Fourth Principle is that one should never cite losers’ history as an
authoritative source of textual meaning. No judge would ever confuse a
dissenting opinion with a majority opinion, yet this is precisely what happens
when a judge uses losers’ history as Congress’s meaning. One of the greatest
difficulties with the “intent” metaphor is that it obscures the differences
between majorities’ decisions and filibustering minorities’ opposition. Here, I
employ the legislative history in the canonical case of Church of the Holy Trinity
v. United States19 to illustrate how scholars have relied, to their detriment, on
losers’ history.
The Fifth Principle follows from the First: courts and Congress regularly
misunderstand each other precisely because courts fail to understand that
Congress plays by its own rules, not judicial ones. For example, behavior that
follows Congress’s own rules may appear to courts as if it produces ambiguity
and no resolution where a conscientious legislator would find no ambiguity
and a clear decision (based on bills already passed). Similarly, cases that appear
as if they could be solved by a simple textual fix may involve significant and
difficult structural conflicts within the legislature. Here, the infamous snail
darter case, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,20 is used as illustration, along
with Bock Laundry and Public Citizen.
Part III compares rule-based decision theory with other legal scholars’
proposed solutions to the legislative history question, arguing that rule-based
decision theory is superior to a ban on legislative history,21 a set of “federal
rules of statutory interpretation,”22 or democracy-forcing reforms.23 This Part

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

401 U.S. 424 (1971).
143 U.S. 457 (1892).
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that courts should never use legislative history).
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085,
2089 (2002) (arguing that Congress should pass a set of federal rules of statutory interpretation).
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counters four potential objections to the use of legislative history by arguing
that, relative to existing practice, decision theory reduces complexity, lowers
costs, respects democratic decisions, and encourages Congress to discipline
itself. This Part argues that decision theory offers a particularly powerful selfenforcing method of statutory construction that may even reduce total
interpretive costs relative to a complete ban on legislative history.24
If nothing else, as a matter of legislative supremacy, if courts must respect
Congress’s decisions, then judges—and administrators, where it may matter
more25—must begin the process of understanding Congress’s methods.
Congress has independent incentives to know and follow its own rules apart
from any particular statutory interpretation case or any theory of statutory
interpretation. Indeed, given that it requires no knowledge whatsoever of
judicial practice,26 including canons of construction, decision theory will be far
easier for congressional staffers to understand and use than theories that
appear to require that they have knowledge of canons or judicial decisions,
knowledge that empirical work shows to be scarce in Congress.27 Finally, to the

23.

24.
25.

26.
27.
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See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162
(2002) [hereinafter Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting]; Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating
Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002) [hereinafter Elhauge, PreferenceEstimating].
On the distinction between interpretation and construction, see ROBERT W. BENNETT &
LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 3-4 (2011).
I agree with Professors Mashaw and Vermeule that far more statutory interpretation is done
in the administrative sphere than elsewhere. See VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 225-26; Jerry L.
Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency
Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 502-03 (2005) (“[A]gencies are, by necessity,
the primary official interpreters of federal statutes . . . .”). It may even be that administrators
are more expert in Congress’s rules than are judges. This is an empirical question that
deserves investigation and may support application of these rules in the administrative
sphere. Because my focus is on courts in this Article, I leave to another day the question of
administrative interpretation, without any intention to suggest that it is any less important
or pervasive. It should be noted that debates about administrative interpretation are often
carried on in the shadow of the standard debates about judicial interpretation. See, e.g., Glen
Staszewski, Introduction to Symposium on Administrative Statutory Interpretation, 2009 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (describing Michael Herz as arguing for a purposivist view and Staszewski
as arguing for a textualist view in the context of administrative agency interpretation).
See VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 118-29 (criticizing interpretive theories that require a
significant amount of coordination among judges).
Katzmann, supra note 6, at 688 (noting Judge Katzmann’s experience as part of a Judicial
Conference committee finding that congressional “committee staff did not know” about
judicial opinions on technical aspects of statutes); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter,
The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 575
(2002) (suggesting, based on an empirical study, that “although drafters are generally

a decision theory of statutory interpretation

extent courts follow this approach and Congress understands them to do so, it
reduces Congress’s own incentives to manipulate the process. If, for example,
members know that losers’ history does not count, then losers have no
incentive to try to manipulate the record; and if Congress’s rules do matter,
then members will have an even greater incentive than they already do to
conform to the rules.
In Part IV, I address theoretical questions raised by calling this a “positive”
political theory, distinguishing rule-based decision theory from existing
anticipation-response and signaling models. The problem with existing
positive political theory (PPT) is its failure to foreground that which its
adherents know,28 but do not emphasize: the congressional “rules of the
game.” In fact, PPT and decision theory share a theoretical ambition that
“[w]ith a proper theory of statute making . . . , we can effectively ground the
interpretation of legislative history.”29 Rule-based decision theory, however, is
likely to be far more attractive to judges and legal scholars in general because it
is both rule based and text based, focusing the analyst on pivotal points in a
decisionmaking process and using that process as an internal preference
aggregation mechanism, rather than relying on other external measures (such
as voting coalitions).30 More importantly, relative to the enormously
information-demanding early forms of PPT, this approach allows one to limit
the legislative record, in some cases quite dramatically, by reversing the
sequential process.31

28.

29.
30.

31.

familiar with judicial rules of construction, these rules are not systematically integrated into
the drafting process”).
Rodriguez & Weingast, New Perspectives, supra note 12, at 1473 (emphasizing the importance
of a pre-cloture substitute); see id. at 1518-20 (relying on the importance of the pre-cloture
substitute to analyze a particular text); id. at 1500-01 (rejecting reliance on certain legislative
history precisely because it occurred before the pre-cloture substitute).
Id. at 1524.
This may come as a surprise to some decision theorists, but they should consider that rules
may be a form of preference aggregation preferable to voting or ideological scores. Recent
work in philosophy and PPT suggests that coherent preference aggregation can be achieved
by other means, such as “a premise-based or sequential priority procedure.” CHRISTIAN LIST
& PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY 58 (2011). For criticisms of standard voting-based models,
see JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 99 (1997), which criticizes some positive political theorists’ approach
as “enormously information demanding” and offering “a tool that [judges] cannot use.”
Fans of PPT should refer to Part IV for a more detailed analysis. My basic point is twofold.
First, the anticipation-response version of PPT (typically referred to as game theory and
associated with William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80
GEO. L.J. 523 (1992)) needs to contend with the fact that members may have no incentive to
respond to the institution down the line because electoral incentives dominate their decision
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i. rethinking legislative “intent” as constitutional heuristic
In 1930, Max Radin wrote one of the most famous law review articles on
statutory interpretation. In it, he made a classic “realist” claim that there was
no such thing as “legislative intent.”32 In the 1950s, legal process scholars aimed
to rehabilitate statutory interpretation by renaming specific intent as a more
general “purpose,” a move that intensified, rather than diminished, the
fictional character of the inquiry by suggesting to their readers (if only for
purposes of discussion) a wholly unrealistic view of the legislature as akin to
judicial actors, as “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes
reasonably.”33 Fifty years later, textualists resurrected Professor Radin’s
critique, denouncing legislative history on the theory that text should prevail
over any “imaginary” congressional intent.34
Textualists’ powerful critique of legislative intent has spread beyond
statutory interpretation specialists. Just as legal academics and judges have split
on this issue, so too have political scientists. As Kenneth Shepsle famously put
it: Congress is a “they,” not an “it.”35 Other positive political theorists disagree:
Daniel Rodriguez and Barry Weingast urge that legislative history be given its
due.36 A similar battle repeats itself in serious jurisprudential debates. Literary
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33.

34.
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36.
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(no one was ever elected because they wrote statutes clear enough to survive appellate
review). Second, as far as signaling theory goes, actual points of rule-based compromise
may serve to aggregate preferences more accurately than do ideological scores or voting
records. In the latter case, I agree with Miriam Jorgensen and Kenneth Shepsle about the
difficulty of determining ex post the members of the enacting coalition. See Miriam R.
Jorgensen & Kenneth A. Shepsle, A Comment on the Positive Canons Project, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 46-47 (1994). As even those who are enthusiastic about rational choice
models have argued, these models posit simple assumptions that may be wildly inconsistent
with empirical reality and need new ideas as well as data to keep them alive. Terry M. Moe,
The Revolution in Presidential Studies, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 701, 710 (2009) (“[T]he
players in these formal models are optimizers whose assumed capacities for calculation and
information processing are typically light years beyond those of real people.”); id. at 713
(arguing that good ideas are likely to test and push rational choice theories in the future).
Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 872 (1930).
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
The Foundation Press 1994) (1958).
See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 21, at 31 (“I object to the use of legislative history on principle,
since I reject intent of the legislature as the proper criterion of the law.”); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509 (1998) (reviewing
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)).
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1992).
Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox, supra note 12, at 1226-33.
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theorist Stanley Fish claims that it is impossible to interpret text without
assigning intent, that statements are inherently intentional acts;37 meanwhile,
legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron argues that Congress’s multiplicity renders
legislative “intent” impossible to know.38 Even more recent work in political
theory from Christian List and Philip Pettit argues that group agency is indeed
possible and can be rational.39
A. Intent as an Injunction About Judging to Judges
The problem with this debate is the debate itself. The notion of
congressional intent is built upon a metaphor,40 and precisely because it is a
metaphor, it is true in some senses, but false in others. As Aristotle said of
metaphor, it “is the application of a strange term either transferred from the
genus and applied to the species or from the species and applied to the genus,
or from one species to another or else by analogy.”41 Congressional intent
hinges on an obvious error of composition: reducing a multiperson institution
to a single person. The “strange term,” to use Aristotle’s phrase, is the
individual. As Jeremy Waldron has argued so cogently, the very essence of
Congress is its plurality, its multiplicity, its 535-ness.42 In this sense, the
“Congress-is-a-person” analogy is misleading: Congress has no brain, no
desire, no hopes or dreams. Taken to its metaphorical extreme, congressional
intent suggests the rather implausible proposition that one is looking inside
members’ minds when looking at legislative history, or that legislators, unlike

37.

38.
39.

40.

41.

42.

STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF
THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 99-100 (1989); Stanley Fish, Play of Surfaces:
Theory and the Law, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY & PRACTICE 297, 300-01
(Gregory Leyh ed., 1992).
WALDRON, supra note 8, at 119-46.
LIST & PETTIT, supra note 30, at 59 (“We have argued that it is possible, at least in principle,
for a group to aggregate the intentional attitudes of its members into a single system of such
attitudes held by the group as a whole.”).
One might also argue that the term “decision” is a metaphor. My defense is that this is a
better metaphor than others since it reduces distracting debates over matters such as
whether we should be looking for legislators’ states of mind or whether legislative history is
subjective as opposed to objective.
23 ARISTOTLE, The Poetics, in ARISTOTLE IN 23 VOLUMES § 1457b (W.H. Fyfe trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1932), http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext
%3A1999.01.0056%3Asection%3D1457b.
WALDRON, supra note 8, at 10 (“Statutes . . . are essentially—not just accidentally—the
product of large and polyphonous assemblies.”).
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corporate officers or any other principal, would actually have to read an agent’s
document to be bound by it.43 That is the work of the false side of the metaphor.
There is, however, a truer side to the metaphor. We talk about collective
entities all the time: Harvard thinks this, Yale does that.44 Positive political
theorists are right on this score: the idea that we do not talk about collective
entities flies in the face of general linguistic usage and common law practice.45
No one would conclude that a corporation is not bound by a contract because
it was drafted by its lawyers and therefore does not reflect the intent of the
corporation.46 Just as corporations are bound by the statements of their
agents, Congress may be bound by the statements of its agents.47
Even if one does not accept the recent philosophical work supporting group
agency, one should at least accept that, however fictional, the concept of group
agency exists in the law. And if such a rule is good enough for corporations and
other legal entities, query why it should not be good enough for Congress.
Over the course of the past twenty years, the debate about congressional
intent has vacillated between the two sides of the metaphor—from the “it” to
the “they” and back—when both are in part true. That is the very nature of a

43.

44.

45.
46.

47.
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Positive political theorists have made the point that, although it is often complained that
legislators do not read legislative history, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S.
504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), lawyers do not hold corporate
officers to the same standard. A document is not ignored because the head of the
corporation has not read it. See McNollgast, Intent, supra note 12, at 19-20.
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
845, 864-65 (1992) (arguing that members’ motives or purposes need not be unanimous to
ascribe a purpose or intent to the group).
See Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox, supra note 12, at 1227-28.
See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 129 (2d ed. 2003) (“A corporation
cannot see or know anything except by the eyes or intelligence of its officers.” (quoting
Factors’ & Traders’ Ins. Co. v. Marine Dry Dock & Shipyard Co., 31 La. Ann. 149, 151
(1879))).
“It is well settled that if an officer or agent of a corporation acquires or possesses knowledge
in the course of her employment as to matters that are within the scope of her authority, this
knowledge is imputed to the corporation.” Id. at 358 (citing Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v.
Robertson, 713 F.2d 1151, 1163 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Pubs, Inc., 618 F.2d 432, 438 (7th Cir.
1980)). “Courts generally base the doctrine that a principal is chargeable with knowledge of
facts known to an agent on the agent’s duty to communicate his knowledge to the principal
and the presumption that this duty has been performed; the presumption is usually treated
as conclusive.” Id. at 360-61; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (2006)
(“Imputation of Notice of Fact to Principal”); WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY
AND PARTNERSHIP 133 (3d ed. 2001) (citing Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So. 2d 291, 294 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Ouachita Equip. Rental Co. v. Trainer, 408 So. 2d 930, 935 (La. Ct.
App. 1981)) (“The general rule is that the knowledge of an agent is to be imputed to the
principal.”).
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metaphor. There is no question, for example, that Congress is a body of
multiple players, none of whom might actually intend the ultimate text
resulting from institutional deliberation. As Jeremy Waldron has urged,
Congress might choose a machine to aggregate its votes,48 but even a machine
has a written protocol (rules) for aggregating votes.49 Congress’s texts are the
product of rules creating stability and facilitating decisionmaking; these rules
are in effect means for aggregating individual preferences.50 They may favor
some and not others; they may even be violated, but the point is that there are
rules. Accepting such rules does not commit one to thinking the interpreter is
looking for a single unified intent, or even multiple intents, but only that there
is a bill whose text has been created in part by these rules and procedures.51
To see how the concept of “intention” has distorted the legal debate,
engage in an intellectual experiment. Strike the term “intent” and replace it
with the term “meaning” (as Holmes suggests52) or “decision” (as I
recommend). It makes fine sense to say that a particular text was the result of a
congressional decision; one need not describe the decision as a matter of intent
to understand that a choice has been made. Once we strike the term “intent,”
the tendency to think that we are looking in minds or for subjective desires
dwindles because the term “intent” is doing so much of the debate’s intellectual
work.53 If we switch to the term “decision,” the implication that there is
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52.
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WALDRON, supra note 8, at 126. Waldron’s example is borrowed from the philosopher
Richard Wollheim.
The literature on originalism in constitutional interpretation tends to reject Waldron’s
position that there can be no collective intent. See, e.g., BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 24, at
162-63.
LIST & PETTIT, supra note 30, at 56 (arguing that “sequential priority procedures,” where
procedures are ordered on an agenda, can produce coherent majority voting because
attitudes on the “new proposition [are] constrained by attitudes on earlier propositions”);
see id. at 58 (concluding that to achieve collective rationality, “[a]n aggregation function
such as a premise-based or sequential priority procedure enables a group not only to form
rational intentional attitudes but also to do so in a way that collectivizes reason”).
See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND
AGENCY 111 (1999) (“To understand shared intention, then, we should not appeal to an
attitude in the mind of some superagent; nor should we assume that shared intentions are
always grounded in prior promises.”).
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899)
(“We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.”).
Of course, it makes good sense to argue, as Professor Manning has, that we should not
reduce Congress to the statements of a single proponent or committee. John F. Manning,
Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 675 (1997). Congress could
not constitutionally give its de jure power to legislate to a committee or to a single senator or
House member. But this does not mean that courts may ignore Congress’s decisions about
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something necessarily subjective or individualistic lessens quite dramatically.
This intellectual experiment suggests that the great objectivity/subjectivity
debates about legislative intent are heavily influenced by semantics, in the
sense that the overarching debate depends upon the contingent meaning of a
particular word (intent). By suggesting this, I do not mean to denigrate in any
way the extraordinary work of those who have struggled with the collective
“intent” argument in productive ways, from Justice Scalia to Jeremy Waldron
to Kent Greenawalt.54 My claim is only that these accounts, however important
at a philosophical or jurisprudential level, remain untethered from one
important congressional reality: the rules.
A “decision,” as I define it here, is capable of capturing the idea that there
may be no final or complete collective intent, while at the same time
acknowledging that intentions may stop at a moment of decision. Decision
theory differs from intentionalism in important theoretical and philosophical
respects. It does not deny that persons or groups may have something we
describe as an intention,55 but, following the work of action philosophers, such
as Michael Bratman, it contends that intentions are events that reach at least
temporary closure at a moment of decision. Those decisions can be overridden,
after a series of other intentional events, but there are identifiable stopping
points where no further intentions are relevant. These stopping points, as I
argue, are moments in the legislative process marked by rules, which close off
debate, whether in committee, on the floor, or in conference committee.56

54.
55.

56.
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its own texts, when the alternative is to impose the judiciary’s own meaning. The answer to
that question requires a constitutional theory. See Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding
Congress (Sept. 12, 2012) (unpublished book manuscript) (on file with author).
KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS (1999);
SCALIA, supra note 21, at 16-23; WALDRON, supra note 8, at 109-29.
In acknowledging that decisions may be intentional, I am not asking that judges imagine or
reconstruct intentions as states of mind. A judge with a gap in a statute has to construct an
answer to the problem. As today’s originalists have made clear, construction is the legal
effect of a term and may differ from its original meaning. So, too, in statutory
interpretation, the judge must seek the legal effect of Congress’s decisions in the case of
ambiguity. This does not require judges to project themselves into the political situation by
imaginative effort, but to know the rules of the game and when those rules will help them
make a judgment about the legal effect of a statute.
Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, 101 PHIL. REV. 327, 340 (1992) (“A joint
activity can be cooperative down to a certain level and yet competitive beyond that. . . . [In
playing chess,] [y]ou and I do not intend that our subplans mesh all the way down. But you
and I do intend that our subplans mesh down to the level of the relevant rules and practices.
Our chess playing . . . is jointly intentional, and it involves shared cooperation down to the
cited level.”). I thank Larry Solum and Greg Klass for pointing this work out to me.
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Ultimately, the great legal historian Willard Hurst was correct when, in
replying to Max Radin, he urged that “legislative intent” is a fiction, but a
fiction with a purpose: to help judges better serve the separation of powers.
Long ago, Hurst argued that the concept of “legislative intent” reminds judges
that it is not their decisions, but the people’s decisions, that count in a
democracy.57 Recent empirical work has shown that viewing “intent” as a check
on judges (rather than a search for subjective meaning) may be an important
restraint on judicial bias. In a study conducted by Ward Farnsworth, Dustin
Guzior, and Anup Malani, when readers searched for ordinary meaning (the
meaning of someone else), they resisted their own policy preferences relative to
a search for ambiguity.58 In James Brudney and Corey Ditslear’s study,
legislative history constrained liberal Justices to reach conservative outcomes.59
This work is particularly important given Michael Abramowicz and Emerson
Tiller’s findings that citation of legislative history does have an ideological
tilt.60 Hurst was correct when he urged that the point of “legislative intent”
was not to supplant text, nor to search for one’s friends, but to constrain
judges’ ideological and cognitive biases.61 In its best sense, “legislative intent”
is a message for judges about judging, not an accurate or even necessary
description of Congress.
B. The Poverty of Current Theory on Congressional Procedure
In part, the failure to move beyond standard debates about intentionalism
reflects ignorance of how Congress works: neither law professors nor judges
have typically worked in a legislature.62 The great debates about legislative
history and intent have settled in slovenly fashion in that old sludge of a
controversy about subjectivity and objectivity. “Can we read the minds of the
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58.
59.
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HURST, supra note 13, at 32-33.
Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Malani, Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An
Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257, 272 (2010).
Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 2, at 148-49 (arguing that liberal Justices are constrained in
their liberalism to take conservative pro-employer positions by reference to legislative
history).
Michael Abramowicz & Emerson H. Tiller, Citation to Legislative History: Empirical Evidence
on Positive Political and Contextual Theories of Judicial Decision Making, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 419,
436-38 (2009) (finding both that Democratic appointees generally place more weight than
Republican appointees on legislative history, and that judges of both parties on three-judge
panels are more likely to cite legislative history when more Democratic appointees are on the
panel).
HURST, supra note 13, at 32-34.
Rudesill, supra note 6, at 706-08.
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legislators?” the objectivists ask. “But can there be a law without some will?”
say the subjectivists. This kind of debate occurs all over the law and
produces many disputes, but it never manages to describe the law, which
tends to adopt both objective and subjective approaches simultaneously.63
The problem is neither subjectivity nor objectivity. If lawyers find no
difficulty in understanding the complexities of other collective entities, such as
corporations or administrative agencies, one wonders why it is too difficult to
understand Congress.
Consider the poverty of current theories on the matter of congressional
procedure. Textualism imagines Congress as a failed court, paying no attention
whatsoever to congressional procedure on the theory that it is too chaotic
or incoherent.64 Textual theorists are mightily concerned with their own
institution, the judiciary, and its legitimacy. They pay great attention to the
canons of interpretation and procedural rules of courts, such as deference to
administrative interpretation. And yet they pay scant attention to the rules
of Congress. This is particularly ironic given the fact that judicial emphasis
on text sometimes appears less motivated by a focus on language (which
often yields to common law or canons) than by the notion of a “rulebound” jurisprudence.65 The rules that appear to matter to textualists are
judicial, not congressional, rules. But there is nothing necessary about this;
indeed, there are good reasons to believe that the focus on canons, common
law, and judicial precedent runs directly contrary to how Congress in fact
drafts statutes.66 Textualists can gain enormous power from decision theory
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Victoria Nourse, After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Objectivity/Subjectivity Question, 11
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 33, 36 (2008). For a more incisive analysis, see the rejection of this
debate in Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005). I expect that a good
deal of this debate may emanate from contract scholarship. See STEVEN J. BURTON,
ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION § 1.3.2-1.3.3, at 21-34 (2009) (comparing objective
and subjective interpretive regimes in contract interpretation). The contract analogy in
statutory interpretation is at best incomplete: there are rules governing the parties
“contracting” for statutes, which have no precise analogue in standard contract law.
However, this is not to say that, for some purposes, the analogy may not be apt.
See Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian
Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1138-42 (2011).
See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (2006)
(“[I]f textualism’s description of interpretation had much in common with legal realism, its
aspirations for the judiciary had much in common with legal formalism.”); Nelson, supra
note 63, at 349 (“My central argument is that . . . different attitudes toward what academics
call ‘rules’ and ‘standards’ could still generate the very same divide that we currently observe
[between textualists and intentionalists].”).
Nourse & Schacter, supra note 27 (arguing, based on a qualitative study, that canons and
precedent may have little weight in drafting by congressional staffers).
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by emphasizing rules likely to clarify the central texts, as I show throughout
this Article.67
Purposivists are as oblivious of congressional rules as are textualists, 68
although purposivists have no aversion to legislative history. To the extent
purposivists rely upon generalized statements of legislative history drawn
from random sources, they generate fodder for the new textualist critique: if
purposivists make no distinction between winners and losers, or between
committee reports and conference committee reports, they may make very
serious errors (as we will see). It is just as easy for purposivists to come up
with an interpretation vindicating losers’ history as for textualists to come up
with such an interpretation by, for example, focusing on a bit of text that is
contradicted by other text.69 On the other hand, if purposivists were to
follow the rules, they might have more powerful legislative history to rebut
textualists’ challenges, adding rigor and simplicity to their analyses. In fact,
precisely because these rules help inform the choice of relevant texts,
purposivists have new and important grounds to defend their recourse to
legislative history.
C. Positive Political Theory
The most significant academic competitor to textualism or purposivism
frequently flies under the banner of “positive political theory.” Although
approaches carrying this name differ,70 a number of political scientists have
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See infra Subsection II.B.2 (discussing Weber).
See Nourse, supra note 64, at 1148-49 (critiquing purposivism for its lack of realism about
Congress).
See infra Section II.A (Public Citizen) and Subsection II.B.1 (Bock Laundry); see also In re
Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989) (relying on one part of a statute without fully
accounting for the contradictions between that part of the statute and other parts left out of
the opinion). Sinclair’s textual choices are explained in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP
P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 996 (4th ed. 2007), which discusses the statute in
Sinclair and reports that “according to prevalent rumors in one segment of the bankruptcy
bar, at the behest of lending interests a Senate staff member put § 302 into the bill, contrary
to the apparent wishes of the sponsors and supporters of the 1986 statute.”
There are obviously many versions of positive political theory and its application to law. See,
e.g., Emerson H. Tiller, Resource-Based Strategies in Law and Positive Political Theory: CostBenefit Analysis and the Like, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1453 (2002) (focusing on decision resources as
a prominent aspect of positive political theory). I emphasize the two approaches appearing
later in this paragraph because these are the most prominent among legal scholars of
statutory interpretation.
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offered sophisticated theories of statute-making.71 They are called “positive”
theories because they aim to provide an empirically grounded view of
Congress. In seminal pieces beginning in the late 1970s, Kenneth Shepsle and
Barry Weingast argued that Congress is not as chaotic as some political
theories predict, but that stable or equilibrium policy choices are reached
through institutional means. They emphasized the power of the rules and
agenda-setting mechanisms to avoid policy cycling, as predicted by Arrow’s
Theorem.72 Later, these scholars aimed to apply their approach to find a
“method[]” of statutory interpretation “compatible with how legislation is
actually created.”73 Two prominent versions of that method have emerged in
the law review literature. In one version, the “anticipation-response” approach,
John Ferejohn and William Eskridge have argued that Congress will generally
anticipate what courts will do in interpreting a statute.74 In another version, the
“signaling” version, Daniel Rodriguez and Barry Weingast have argued that it
is possible to rhetorically analyze whether legislators are engaging in cheap talk
or costly signals, and that one can do this best by looking for statements made
to persuade pivotal compromise voters.75
In this Article, I offer a version of positive political theory that differs
substantially from existing theories. I call this “rule-based decision theory”
because, unlike existing positive political theory, it foregrounds Congress’s
own rules. It is a positive theory because it depends upon an empirical vision of
how Congress works. However, rule-based decision theory diverges from some
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John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L.
REV. L. & ECON. 263, 265 (1992); McNollgast, Intent, supra note 12; McNollgast, Positive
Canons, supra note 12; Rodriguez & Weingast, New Perspectives, supra note 12; Rodriguez &
Weingast, Paradox, supra note 12.
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting
Models, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 27, 27 (1979) (offering a model of legislative behavior that results
in “equilibrium”); Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 7, at 6-7. For a succinct description of
Arrow’s Theorem, see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 7-8 (1994).
McNollgast, Intent, supra note 12, at 5; see also McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 12, at
706 (emphasizing the need for an “explicit theory” of legislative history).
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 31 (positing policy outcomes based on the interaction of
Congress and courts based on game theory); see Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 71, at 265
(advancing a theory of statutory interpretation based on the interaction of courts and
Congress).
Rodriguez & Weingast, New Perspectives, supra note 12; Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox,
supra note 12; see also McNollgast, Intent, supra note 12, at 7 (“[A]scertaining legislative
intent requires separating the meaningless actions (or signals) of participants in the
legislative process from the consequential signals that are likely to reveal information about
the coalition’s intentions.”).
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standard assumptions suggested by the term “decision theory.” Positive
political theorists tend to use the term “decision theory” to mean a procedure
by which political preferences are aggregated. Typically, political scientists use
legislative votes or ideological scores (liberal or conservative) to assess
members’ preferences. By contrast, the theory I propose here—rule-based
decision theory—posits that Congress’s rules dominate members’
preferences.76 Indeed, the rules help to form preferences: if in the game of
chess, moving a piece in a particular direction violates the rules, one’s
preference cannot be to move pieces in that direction. Similarly, in Congress,
the rules form and limit members’ preferences. If a member knows that she
needs sixty votes to obtain bill passage, she will temper her ideal preferences
and may even diverge from her own party’s preferences or ideology, if the bill
is important to her electoral future. This is true as well of models that assume
anticipation across institutions: one can fairly well predict that one’s chess
opponent will not move a piece in a way that violates the rules.77 If I am correct
that rules may dominate and form preferences, then rules must be taken into
account in any theory that aims to reflect how Congress really works.
D. Rule-Based Decision Theory
Rule-based decision theory is a distinctive theory of statutory
interpretation because, unlike purposivism, textualism, or positive political
theory, it rejects standard forms of intentionalism.78 The theory searches for
Congress’s decisions based on Congress’s rules. It starts with the text, as all
statutory theories do, but unlike textualism, it posits that interpreters may not
find the proper text without looking at legislative history (a position likely to
seem oxymoronic to most textualists, as they define themselves as rejecting
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See LIST & PETTIT, supra note 30, at 58 (arguing that “a premise-based or sequential priority
procedure enables a group not only to form rational intentional attitudes but also to do so in
a way that collectivizes reason”). Note that the Principles I emphasize in the Article are
sequential and that the legislation as introduced is the starting point of the sequential
process.
In this sense, rule-based decision theory diverges from the “positive canons” grounded in
contract law. See McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 12, at 708-09. It also rejects the
positive canons project’s willingness to adhere to the language of intent, based on the
contract analogy, and insists instead upon the notion of an institutional decision.
In rejecting intentionalism, I am not rejecting the philosophical arguments that a collective
intent may, in theory, be established sequentially. See, e.g., LIST & PETTIT, supra note 30. Nor
am I saying that intentionalism does not have a heuristic purpose; it does—as a judicial
restraint. I am saying that I believe the use of the term “intention” muddies the waters and is
best avoided when considering how texts are in fact created within the legislature.
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legislative history). Rule-based theory looks to legislative history, then, in cases
where textualists would not, but for reasons textualists should accept: to
determine text. Similarly, this theory both diverges and converges with some
aspects of purposivism. Like purposivism and some forms of positive political
theory, it has no hesitancy in researching legislative history as information
helpful to find Congress’s meaning. However, unlike purposivism, it does not
posit a unified collective intent, or look to legislative history to find vague
purposes, but looks for Congress’s textual decisions in the actual rule-based
history of the statute.
Today, we are all textualists and we are all purposivists. Purposivists begin
with text, and textualists look to text to find purpose. The only difference lies
in how one conceives of legislative history. Decision theory makes its most
important contribution in that arena by rejecting the distracting influence of
intentionalism on both purposivism and textualism. Decision theory will not
solve every statutory interpretation case, but it can make the use of legislative
history more objective and easier, and free it from the intellectual diversions of
intentionalism. In Part II, I aim to show how rule-based theory transforms
basic scholarly understandings about central cases taught to law students
across the country.79 I offer five Principles that exemplify the advantages of a
rule-based theory as it applies to legislative history. These Principles illustrate
the basic distinction between rule-based theory and current approaches. In Part
III, I consider objections to the Principles I have offered in Part II. In Part IV, I
offer a more complete explanation of rule-based decision theory writ large, by
distinguishing it from other forms of positive political theory.
ii. simple principles for reading legislative history
Courts and scholars make sweeping statements about legislative history: it
is far too complex and heterogeneous to be understood; always manipulated or
produced by non-legislators; generated by a “chaotic” or “tortuous”
institution.80 As Adrian Vermeule has insisted, these are empirical claims.81 In
theory, they may be falsified. My argument will not resolve the empirical
questions at a high level of generality. To do that would require a much larger

79.
80.
81.

90

In other work, I will have to defend the larger empirical proposition that decision theory can
in fact simplify the use of legislative history by appellate courts at a systemic level.
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 423, 431-32 (2005).
VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 149 (“[E]mpirical questions about legal interpretation are
inescapable . . . .”); see also id. at 109 (positing that “legislative history is distinctively
voluminous and heterogeneous in comparison with other interpretive sources”).
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study.82 But my argument does suggest that such claims may be falsified in
individual high-profile cases regularly taught and debated by legal scholars
and, if so, that we must question at the very least what we are teaching
students and what we as scholars are arguing about. We cannot know that
legislative history is impossibly complex unless we look at the hard case for the
critics—when legislative history is easy and at its best.
Legislative history is at its best when understood within Congress’s own
rules. Just as no one would try to understand the meaning of a trial transcript
without understanding the rules of evidence or civil procedure, no one should
try to understand legislative history without understanding Congress’s own
rules. This does not resolve, as we will see, the ultimate empirical question, but
neither does it posit some vague normative ideal, borrowed from political
theory or constitutional thought, to answer central interpretive questions.83 Of
course, some will charge that my examples are anecdotal or particularly
friendly to the argument. If so, they are no worse than the standard fare, as
claims both for and against legislative history rely upon precisely the same
“friends” I invoke here.84 At its most minimal, my claim is for one simple, but

82.

83.

84.

The question is not simply whether a larger study could be done but whether the cases cited
in this Article have any claim to being representative of the use of legislative history, aside
from the fact that they are representative of the cases taught to law students; they are indeed
representative of the cases taught in the top casebooks and law review articles. See infra note
84. Moreover, as a matter of rule relevance, there is evidence to suggest that the cases I
discuss are not unrepresentative. Barbara Sinclair reports that, from the 1960s to the 1990s,
over three-quarters of all major legislation went to conference committee, see BARBARA
SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS
91 (4th ed. 2012), which suggests the importance of rules governing conference committees.
As Sinclair also notes, it is unclear whether this trend will continue in the near term because
of the rise of the use of the filibuster to block conferences. Id. at 101-02. But filibusters
themselves, which are part of the rule-based analysis, are moments of important
compromise, and are now applicable to all legislation. GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC
SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: OBSTRUCTION AND LAWMAKING IN THE U.S. SENATE 10 (2006)
(“The Senate’s rules that protect unlimited debate . . . effectively require supermajorities for
the passage of legislation . . . .”); see 157 CONG. REC. S311 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2011) (statement
of Sen. Tom Harkin) (noting that in the 110th and 111th Congresses, there were “275
filibusters in just over 4 years. It has spun out of control. This is not just a cold statistic of
275 filibusters. It means the filibuster, instead of a rare tool to slow things down, has become
an everyday weapon of obstruction, of veto.”).
VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 31 (arguing that “formal constitutional premises . . . mandate
neither formalist interpretive methods nor nonformalist interpretive methods,” and so the
resolution of that dispute depends upon institutional and empirical issues).
The principal cases I discuss in this Article—Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice,
Green v. Bock Laundry, TVA v. Hill, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, United
Steelworkers v. Weber, and Griggs v. Duke Power—are precisely the ones typically referred to
by those who argue for or against legislative history, particularly in the scholarly literature
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powerful, canon of construction: just as Congress is presumed to know and
follow the “surrounding body of law,”85 there should be an even stronger
presumption that Congress knows and follows its own rules.86
A. First Principle: Never Read Legislative History Without Knowing
Congress’s Own Rules
Consider an easy example based on an apparently hard case. Public Citizen
v. U.S. Department of Justice87 involved the American Bar Association’s
recommendations to the President on judicial nominations. The question
raised was whether the ABA had to satisfy the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA), which requires certain governmental entities “established or

85.

86.

87.

92

and in casebooks. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
44-47 (1994) (discussing Bock Laundry); id. at 74-80 (discussing Griggs); id. at 208-10
(discussing Holy Trinity); id. at 219-25 (discussing TVA v. Hill); SCALIA, supra note 21, at
21-22 (discussing Holy Trinity); VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 87-117 (discussing Holy
Trinity); id. at 28-29 (discussing TVA); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116
HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2479-80 (2003) [hereinafter Manning, Absurdity Doctrine] (discussing
Bock Laundry); John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 399, 415-17 (2010) (discussing Public Citizen); John F. Manning, Federalism and the
Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2011-13 (2009)
[hereinafter Manning, Federalism] (discussing Holy Trinity); Rodriguez & Weingast, New
Perspectives, supra note 12, at 1501-10 (discussing Griggs); id. at 1517-21 (discussing
Weber). They also appear prominently in major casebooks in the field. See, e.g.,
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 69, at 42-47 (Griggs); id. at 88-100 (Weber); id. at 743-44
(Public Citizen); id. at 752-55 (TVA); id. at 766-75 (Bock Laundry); JOHN F. MANNING &
MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 4-17 (2010) (TVA); id. at
38-43 (Holy Trinity); id. at 89-96 (Public Citizen).
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(offering a reading of a statute based on “ordinary usage” and “most compatible with
the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated—a
compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind”).
One might object that Congress does not in fact follow its own rules. In the case I have
described, however, it does not follow that the original rule evasion is not incorporated into
the final majoritarian decision. If a conference committee adds material to identical bills,
that would violate the House and Senate rules. A member voting on such a bill with altered
language would assume, per the rules, that the addition was immaterial. This approach
follows the rules that a member would follow in making his or her vote. The rule-based
decision approach thus incorporates knowledge of rule evasion within the proper
majoritarian response to that evasion.
491 U.S. 440 (1989).
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utilized”88 by the President to open their meetings, balance their membership,
and release public reports.89
Today, Public Citizen is taught as a controversial case. For textualists, the
majority opinion commits judicial surgery, cutting the word “utilized” from
the statute. As Justice Kennedy wrote in his concurrence, it is hard not to
believe that the ABA was in fact being “used” by the President.90 Any
conclusion to the contrary depended on how the absurdity canon was applied.
The majority argued that if “utilize” meant “use,” in the ordinary sense, then it
would yield absurd results, covering a meeting of the President with the
NAACP or his own political party.91 Ultimately, the majority decided to read
the relevant statutory term—“utilize”—in a technical rather than “ordinary
meaning” sense, as something of a repetition of the statutory term “establish,”
a result that seems odd as a linguistic matter, but avoided apparent absurdity.92
Among textualists, the majority opinion raises eyebrows not only for its
apparent judicial surgery, but also for its use of the much-debated absurdity
canon and constitutional avoidance.93
There was an easier way to resolve Public Citizen, although this road was
taken neither by the majority opinion (which performed the apparent surgery)
nor by the concurrence (which concluded the statute could not be
constitutionally applied to the President). The answer lies in understanding
when Congress added the term “utilize” to the statute. No lengthy legislative
history is necessary to find the answer. The term “utilize” first appears in the
conference committee report resolving House and Senate differences on FACA.
Conference reports are moments when Congress must resolve disagreements
between texts; more specifically, between the House and Senate versions of a

88.
89.

90.
91.
92.
93.

5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2)(B) (2006).
For the sake of full disclosure, as an appellate litigator at the Department of Justice, I was
involved in briefing FACA cases in the courts of appeals at the time. Later, I was interviewed
by the ABA, accorded a “well qualified” rating, and recommended by the Justice Department
to sit on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 477-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 453 (majority opinion).
See id. at 462-63.
Id. at 452-53 (noting that how “utilized” is interpreted could create absurd results); id. at
465-67 (addressing the issue of constitutional avoidance). But see id. at 482 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the application of FACA to the ABA would be
a “plain violation of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution”). On the absurdity
canon, see Linda D. Jellum, But That Is Absurd!: Why Specific Absurdity Undermines
Textualism, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 917 (2011); and Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 84.
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bill.94 This was certainly true in Public Citizen. The Senate bill going to
conference covered committees “established or organized” by the President;95
the House bill used the term “establish.”96 In other words, the votes in both
the House and the Senate prior to the conference were for “establish” and at
the most “established or organized.” The term “utilize” was nowhere in sight.
Indeed, “utilize” was added in the conference committee, contrary to the bills
passed in both House and Senate.
That “utilize” first appears in the conference report should raise a red flag
for anyone knowledgeable about Congress’s rules. Conference committees
cannot—repeat, cannot—change the text of a bill where both houses have agreed to the
same language.97 Both House and Senate rules bar such changes.98 These rules

94.

95.

96.

97.

98.

94

See CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE, RESEARCH,
AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 780-83 (1989) (noting that a bill goes to conference when the bodies
have reached a “stage of disagreement” and both chambers adopt motions to request a
conference and appoint conferees).
Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 461 (“[T]he Senate bill that grew into FACA defined ‘advisory
committee’ as one ‘established or organized’ by statute, the President, or an Executive
agency.” (quoting S. 3529, 92d Cong. §§ 3(1), (2) (2d Sess. 1972))).
Id. at 459 (“The House bill which in its amended form became FACA applied exclusively to
advisory committees ‘established’ by statute or by the Executive, whether by a federal
agency or by the President himself.” (quoting H.R. 4383, 92d Cong. § 3(2) (2d Sess. 1972))).
H.R. 4838 was passed by the House in May of 1972 and sent to the Senate, which struck the
entirety of the bill after the enacting clause and substituted the text of S. 3529. It went to
conference in September, the Senate agreed to the conference report on September 19, and
the House agreed to the conference report on September 20.
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 111-157, R. XXII (9), at 37 (2011)
[hereinafter HOUSE RULES, 112th Cong.] (“The introduction of any language presenting
specific additional matter not committed to the conference committee by either House does
not constitute a germane modification of the matter in disagreement.”); STANDING RULES OF
THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 112-1, R. XXVIII (2a), at 52 (2011) [hereinafter SENATE RULES,
112th Cong.] (“Conferees shall not insert in their report matter not committed to them by
either House, nor shall they strike from the bill matter agreed to by both Houses”); TIEFER,
supra note 94, at 801 (“Conferees can only approve the conference committee’s
conclusions . . . as a whole, not just the parts they prefer. There is no provision for
additional, separate, or dissenting views for conference reports . . . .”). For a fairly recent
example where the conferees were so insistent upon this that they specifically revoked their
signatures on a conference report, see infra note 287 and accompanying text.
Senate Rule XXVIII “prohibits new components of legislation from being inserted into a
conference report.” DAVID M. PRIMO, RULES AND RESTRAINT: GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND
THE DESIGN OF INSTITUTIONS 7 (2007). “Congress limits [the conferees’] authority to the
differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill . . . by allowing points of
order on both the House and Senate floors against conference reports that exceed that
scope.” TIEFER, supra note 94, at 811; id. at 812-13 (“Conferees cannot remove language both
chambers agree on, or insert new provisions not in either chamber’s version.”).
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limit opportunism by conference committees’ members and ex post control by
drafting committees, since drafters are typically appointed as conferees and
thus get another shot at legislation they themselves drafted. Even if these rules
are flouted at times, members have an incentive to follow them lest the bill be
stalled by a point of order99—a formal objection to proceeding with the bill as
violating the rules—precisely at the point when the maximum effort has been
expended toward passage.100
In Public Citizen, the conference report was simple, strong, and proximate
legislative history. It was the last act on the precise statutory term at issue—
“utilize.” Viewed within the Principles outlined above, a court should defer to
the meaning demanded by Congress’s own rules. According to congressional
rules, the conferees had no power to change the text in any significant way and
therefore a judge should interpret “utilize” precisely as a member of Congress
would interpret it—as making no significant change to “established or
organized.” Ironically, this is precisely the result the Court reached, albeit in
ways that seem highly strained and controversial.101

99.

100.

101.

SENATE RULES, 112th Cong., supra note 97, R. XXVIII 2(b), at 37-38 (“If matter which was
agreed to by both Houses is stricken from the bill a point of order may be made against the
report, and if the point of order is sustained, the report is rejected or shall be recommitted to
the committee of conference if the House of Representatives has not already acted
thereon.”); id. R. XXVIII 2(c), at 38 (“If new matter is inserted in the report, a point of order
may be made against the conference report and it shall be disposed of as provided under
paragraph 4.”); HOUSE RULES, 112th Cong., supra note 97, R. XXII (10), at 37 (“A Member,
Delegate, or Resident Commissioner may raise a point of order against nongermane matter,
as specified in subparagraph (2), before the commencement of debate on . . . a conference
report.”).
It is sometimes said that this rule is quite often flouted, typically in the context of
appropriations bills. See SINCLAIR, supra note 82, at 117-20 (discussing earmarks and
misconceptions about earmarks). The bill may be lit up like a Christmas tree with earmarks,
see Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpretation, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 519, 534-36 (2009), and there will be little incentive for members to object
because each has his or her own individual earmark and thus his or her own violation of the
rule. As I have already noted, see supra note 86, whether Congress does in fact follow its
rules does not undermine the principle that courts should assume that a faithful agent
would follow the rules. Certainly, if we assume members know the surrounding body of
law, we can assume that they know their own rules.
I propose this as a principle to resolve ambiguity, not to supplant the statute’s text. Critics
will claim that congressional procedures, like all legislative history, violate the Bicameralism
Clause. Congress’s rules, of course, are promulgated pursuant to constitutional authority to
regulate their own institution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. This does not mean that they are
law in the sense of the Bicameralism Clause, since each house passes its own rules and they
are never submitted to the President. Like all canons, the principles proposed here are based
on presumptions about congressional behavior, but these canons are far more likely to be
realistic and effective since they depend upon already-endogenous rules.
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The point of my proposed canon is not to undermine text. One might
argue that, since no Senator or House member objected to the term “utilize,” it
should be given a full and independent meaning. But this, again, violates the
rules and the custom of the trade; at the stage where members are voting for a
conference report, this is not a new bill and no amendment may be offered. A
faithful member of Congress would assume that, when both houses pass the
same language, any added language must be read as making no substantive
change in the bill. It is in this sense that a court applying this Principle is not
itself violating the rules of Congress: it is not ignoring the text as passed but
rather interpreting it in light of what the congressional rules say about how a
faithful congressional agent would interpret any last-minute conference
additions. A faithful textualist should apply this interpretation as well, given
that the Constitution requires deference to Congress’s rules.102
This is particularly important in cases of demonstrable ambiguity or
potential absurdity, which was the case in Public Citizen. When a statute is
capable of two meanings (here “utilize” can be read in a prototypical ordinarymeaning sense or in a technical meaning-for-this-statute sense), a court may
look to legislative history to resolve the ambiguity. If the ambiguity is created
in conference committee,103 as it was here, then the court may resolve the
ambiguity by conforming to Congress’s own rules. Those rules tell the
congressperson to assume that the conference has not changed in any
significant way the meaning of any text passed by both houses. Under the
conference committee rules, a member looking at the term “utilize” would
either object (in which case the language would be subject to debate and
potential change) or assume that utilize did not, per the rules, change the
meaning of “establish” in any significant way.104 That is how the judge should
interpret the meaning of “utilize” as well. If courts must respect Congress, as

102.
103.

104.
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
My claim is not that Congress must follow its rules or that courts should make Congress
follow its own rules. My claim is that, when faced with a difficult case of ambiguity, courts
using the First Principle may give language the legal effect demanded by the congressional
rules, in some cases obviating difficult interpretive decisions. By assuming that a member of
Congress reading the conference report was entitled to assume that “utilize” did not
substantially change “establish,” the court defers to Congress without the need to engage in
complex analyses. Decision theory does not require, for example, that a member actually
raise a point of order under the rules.
Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 462 (1989) (“The phrase ‘or utilized’ . . .
appears to have been added simply to clarify that FACA applies to advisory committees
established by the Federal Government in a generous sense of that term, encompassing
groups formed indirectly by quasi-public organizations such as the National Academy of
Sciences ‘for’ public agencies as well as ‘by’ such agencies themselves.”).
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all statutory interpreters agree, then judges should interpret the meaning of
“utilize” in the same way that Congress would.
This analysis requires no lengthy exegesis of the law’s full legislative
history, focusing instead on statutory history (which, as the history of the
statute’s text, has always had a better pedigree than legislative history).105 All
this analysis requires is looking at the bills passed by the House and the Senate
and finding that the key statutory term was added at conference. Even if one
were to invoke the entire conference report, it is a mere thirteen pages long,
eight pages of which are statutory text.106 This is hardly the excessive “volume”
or “heterogeneity”107 that has been asserted by legislative history’s critics. More
importantly, if this analysis is correct, it avoids all sorts of rather controversial
questions: it turns a case that is quite difficult on questions of absurdity,108
constitutional avoidance, and the President’s power to nominate into a far
more straightforward case. Relying on the rules of the conference allows a
judge to defer to Congress’s decisions and, at the same time, restrains judges
from picking out friends or enemies in the legislative history or even the
text.109

105.
106.

107.
108.

109.

Statutory history is the history of the statute’s text as opposed to any committee report or
floor statement commenting on the text.
H.R. REP. NO. 92-1403 (1972) (Conf. Rep.). As the Supreme Court noted, the rather short
conference report supports the notion that the conferees could not have meant “utilize” in
the legalist sense since the conferees explicitly exempted contractors. Id. at 10, quoted in
Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 462 (“The Act does not apply to persons or organizations which
have contractual relationships with Federal agencies nor to advisory committees not directly
established by or for such agencies.”). There are also indications that the Conference may
have added “utilize” to cover presidential transitions. This would, in fact, reconcile the
majority and this proposed principle’s reading with an interpretation of “utilize” that gives it
a meaning (transitions are covered) but rejects the extensive meaning of “use.”
VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 115.
Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 471 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I believe the
Court’s loose invocation of the ‘absurd result’ canon of statutory construction creates too
great a risk that the Court is exercising its own ‘WILL instead of JUDGMENT,’ with the
consequence of ‘substitut[ing] [its own] pleasure to that of the legislative body.’” (quoting
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton))).
Although a systematic study must await another article, there is at least anecdotal evidence
that courts misunderstand (or are unaware of) the rules governing conference reports,
which generally do not allow significant changes to legislation agreed upon in House and
Senate bills prior to conference. See, e.g., Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 406-07 (2005)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (indicating that the conference committee change was significant
enough to cover foreign convictions even though the language passed by the House and the
Senate stated “federal” and “state” offenses); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Gates, 486 F.3d
1316, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (interpreting a last-minute conference change as a “statutory
elephant (in the sense of having a huge impact)”). At the very least, some courts appear to

97

the yale law journal

122:70

2012

B. Second Principle: Later Textual Decisions Trump Earlier Ones
Historians worry about using the present to interpret the past. Precisely
the opposite presumption should apply in reading legislative debates. The
very notion of legislative “history” should be treated as a misnomer. In
legislative debates, sequence is important. Later textual decisions trump earlier ones.
Put in the simplest terms, legislative history should be read in reverse. The last
act may occur in a debate on a post-cloture amendment or in a conference
report or in committee, but one should always start by looking for the last
textual decisionmaking point. The aim should not be to imagine that one is
actually writing a history, but to look for the last textual decision on the
interpretive question.
This Principle of reverse sequential consideration explains the value of
conference committee reports. It is the conventional and correct wisdom
that, of all legislative history “apart from the statute itself, [conference
committee reports are] the most reliable evidence of congressional”
decisions.110 This is not necessarily because of deliberative quality: at the end
of a bill, particularly a long-debated bill, much may be assumed and
rushed.111 This is the moment when the rules narrow the decisions available
to the negotiators. However, conference reports are not the only key
moments of decision; often, the cloture process in the Senate makes the prefilibuster compromise text a very important point of textual decision.112

110.

111.

112.
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ignore Congress’s rules when interpreting language added in conference (as in Public
Citizen). See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985)
(interpreting a new provision added in conference without regard to conference rules); Sec’y
of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 322 (1984) (interpreting language added in
conference without regard to conference rules).
In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 1999); accord Nw. Forest
Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A] congressional conference
report is recognized as the most reliable evidence of congressional intent because it
‘represents the final statement of the terms agreed to by both houses.’” (quoting Dep’t of
Health & Welfare v. Block, 784 F.2d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 1986))).
See SINCLAIR, supra note 82, at 96 (noting the effect of time constraints on Senate
conferees); id. at 98 (“By the time legislation gets to conference, many people, and especially
many of the conferees . . . have a considerable stake in the legislation’s enactment.”).
Senate Rule XXII provides for the closing of debate after a cloture motion:
[A]t any time a motion signed by sixteen Senators, to bring to a close the debate
upon any . . . matter pending before the Senate . . . is presented to the Senate, the
Presiding Officer, or clerk at the direction of the Presiding Officer, shall at once
state the motion to the Senate, and one hour after the Senate meets on the
following calendar day but one, he shall lay the motion before the Senate and
direct that the clerk call the roll, and upon the ascertainment that a quorum is
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To illustrate this Principle, I will consider two statutory interpretation
“classics.” First, let us turn to an opinion by a legislative history advocate:
Justice Stevens’s opinion in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,113 which
provoked an important textualist concurrence by Justice Scalia. Next, we will
turn to a far less enthusiastic advocate of legislative history, Justice Rehnquist,
writing in dissent in United Steelworkers v. Weber,114 a canonical case involving
race discrimination.115 My claim here is not about results, but methodology; as
a personal matter, I tend to disagree with the interpretive result in Bock
Laundry and in Weber, but that is irrelevant to my claim. My point is simpler:
both Justice Stevens and Justice Rehnquist made the legislative history
question much too difficult; both opinions invite the “picking and choosing”
critique. In each case, the relevant legislative history was a fraction of that
which the Court considered. Moreover, in each, knowledge of sequential
textual decisionmaking would have helped judges to focus not only on relevant
legislative history but also on the central text or texts in the case.116

113.
114.
115.
116.

present, the Presiding Officer shall, without debate, submit to the Senate by a
yea-and-nay vote the question: “Is it the sense of the Senate that the debate shall
be brought to a close?” And if that question shall be decided in the affirmative by
three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn—except on a measure or
motion to amend the Senate rules, in which case the necessary affirmative vote
shall be two-thirds of the Senators present and voting—then said measure,
motion, or other matter pending before the Senate, or the unfinished business,
shall be the unfinished business to the exclusion of all other business until
disposed of.
SENATE RULES, 112th Cong., supra note 97, R. XXII, at 20-21.
490 U.S. 504 (1989).
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 69, at 88-100.
In Weber, the relevant text was section 703(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, added after the
original statute and thus clarifying the limits of sections 703(a) and (d). 443 U.S. at 205-08.
In Public Citizen, the relevant text was “established,” the term “utilize” having been added at
conference. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 462 (1988). Similarly, in Bock
Laundry, the central text was “the credibility of a witness,” passed by both houses, with the
term “defendant” being added in conference. 490 U.S. at 520. The same is true of Holy
Trinity. See infra Section II.D (explaining that the major opponent of the bill made a
concession by explaining that the statutory exemption for “lecturers” applied to lecturers on
morals and religion and exempted them from the Act).
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1. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.
Bock Laundry involved Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.117 The
civil plaintiff brought a products liability action against the maker of a
machine used in a car wash. The defendant company sought to impeach the
civil plaintiff based on the plaintiff’s prior felony conviction. The question
was whether Rule 609 covered civil plaintiffs: the rule’s opening clauses
covered all witnesses, but its balancing test covered only “defendants.”118
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion is an excellent example of how not to
read legislative history.119 The opinion begins with the common law,
Wigmore, and other legal treatises and goes on to reference “a seminal
article”120 by Dean Ladd and the 1942 American Law Institute proposal, the
ABA proposal, the D.C. Code, and important caselaw principles, such as the
“Luck doctrine.”121 Congress is nowhere to be found in this putative
treatise.122 It seems quite unlikely, as Justice Scalia noted, that the average

117.
118.
119.

120.
121.

122.
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FED. R. EVID. 609.
490 U.S. at 509-10.
I do not mean to single out Justice Stevens; Justice Rehnquist appears in the next example.
It is fairly easy to find opinions that make simple mistakes about congressional procedure,
for example, failing to distinguish conference committee reports as the text of the bill as
opposed to the joint explanation to the conference committee, which is the legislative
history of the conferees’ agreed-upon text. See, for example, CSX Transportation, Inc. v.
Alabama Department of Revenue, 131 S. Ct. 1101, 1108 (2011), which cites joint explanation
materials as material from the “Conference Report,” indicated as S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-595
at 165-66, when the report is the text, not the joint explanation. So, too, some opinions,
contrary to the conventional wisdom, suggest, in the absence of a conference report, the
equivalence of floor statements with a conference report. See, e.g., Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S.
53, 64 n.5 (1990) (citing a representative’s views that remarks of a floor manager of the Act
have “the effect of being a conference report”); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 17-18
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for giving equal weight to the
author’s statement and to the conference report).
490 U.S. at 512 n.11.
Id. at 511-16; see also id. at 527-28 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Approximately four-fifths of
[the majority’s] substantive analysis is devoted to examining the evolution of Federal
Rule o f Evidence 609, from the 1942 Model Code of Evidence, to the 1953 Uniform
Rules of Evidence, to the 1965 Luck case and the 1970 statute overruling it, to the
Subcommittee, Committee, and Conference Committee Reports, and to the so-called
floor debates on Rule 609 . . . .”).
For another case in which the Court relied upon non-legislative materials, see Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 569-70 (2005), which rejected a committee
report for the views of the Federal Courts Study Committee. See also id. at 575 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the House report as a “virtual billboard of congressional intent”).
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member of Congress had any clue about this history, 123 which is better suited
to an academic than an elected official. If one thinks it dangerous and
potentially self-interested to “look out for one’s friends” in legislative
history,124 how much more dangerous is it to search for one’s friends
among law reviews and treatises? Ultimately, Justice Stevens, like the rest of
the Justices, must perform judicial surgery by inserting words into the text.
The majority concluded that Rule 609 did not apply to a civil plaintiff, based
on a gestalt reading of a lengthy history in which the common law rule
prevailed.125 But this immediately seems odd for two important reasons:
(1) the Senate passed the common law rule and the conference rejected that
rule; and (2) every bill that preceded the conference report applied to civil
cases, with precisely the same language. In fact, at least one member of the
House believed that the ultimate language violated the conference committee
rules barring changes of agreed-upon language by going outside the terms
passed by both houses.126
The important point is that a one-and-a-half page segment of the
conference report’s joint explanation is the relevant legislative history.127 One
need not wade knee-deep in the thirteen-year128 history of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The central focus should have been on Congress’s decision, not
Dean Wigmore’s or Ladd’s treatises or the ALI or ABA rules. More

123.
124.

125.
126.
127.

128.

See 490 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring).
The reference here is to the Judge Harold Leventhal quip that those who look to legislative
history tend to look for their friends. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (“[C]iting
legislative history is still . . . akin to ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’”
(quoting a conversation with Judge Leventhal)).
490 U.S. at 523.
120 CONG. REC. 40,480 (1974) (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman).
H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 2 (1974) (Conf. Rep.) (showing the textual amendment added by
the conference committee); id. at 9-10 (joint explanatory statement of one-and-a-half pages
on Rule 609). Note that if one seeks this conference report in the ProQuest Congressional
database, it may only provide the report and not the “joint explanation” that accompanies
the report. In the text, I am referring to the one-and-a half page part of the “joint
explanation” to the conference report. Bringing up this document in Westlaw’s legislative
history database provides the full document. The bill was passed by the House as H.R. 5463
and retained that number when it was debated and amended in the Senate. Rule 609 was
part of a much larger bill on the Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926
(1975). For the specific language of the House-passed and Senate-passed bills, see infra note
129.
See H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 2 (1973) (“H.R. 5463 is the culmination of almost thirteen
years of study by distinguished judges, Members of Congress, lawyers and others interested
in and affected by the administration of justice in the Federal courts.”).
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importantly, the analysis should not depend on various pieces of legislative
history in the House debate or the Senate debate, because neither bill passed
involved the key textual language at issue, which, as in Public Citizen, first appears
in the conference report and its accompanying joint explanation. One should
start in reverse order, with the texts passed by both houses and the conference
report, as the last acts before the text is fixed.129 However one wants to resolve
that issue,130 the focus should have been on the conference report and the

129.

130.
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H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 9-10 (1974) (Conf. Rep.) (joint explanation of changes to Rule
609). Both the Senate and House bills applied to civil cases; indeed, they used the same
language applying to “the credibility” of a “witness.” The House-passed bill provided:
“(a) General Rule—For the purpose of attacking the credibility of the witness,” evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime is admissible only if the crime involved dishonesty or
false statement. H.R. 5463, 93rd Cong. (as passed by the House, Feb. 6, 1974) (emphasis
added); see 120 CONG. REC. 2374, 2394 (1974) (reporting the House bill as it was debated
on the floor of the House). The Senate-passed bill provided the following:
(a) General Rule. For the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the crime,
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the
law under which he was convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement regardless of the punishment.
H.R. 5463, 93rd Cong. (debated on the Senate floor as H.R. 5463, as amended by Senate,
Nov. 22, 1974) (emphasis added). The Senate bill amended the House bill in Senate floor
debate, so the text of the Senate bill, proposed by Senator McClellan, appears in the
Congressional Record as a floor amendment, 120 CONG. REC. 37,076 (Nov. 22, 1974), which
passes at 120 CONG. REC. 37,084 (Nov. 22, 1974). Even the Senate Committee version,
however, covered all witnesses, and would have applied to all witnesses in a civil case:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been
convicted of a crime may be elicited . . . but only if the crime (1) involved
dishonesty or false statement; or (2) in the case of witnesses other than the
accused, was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year . . . but
only if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect.
See S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 3 (Oct. 11, 1974) (reporting an amendment to the language
passed by the House); id. at 14-15 (explaining the textual changes to Rule 609 made by the
Senate committee). Senator McClellan read the proposed Senate committee amendment
during the Senate debate, 120 CONG. REC. 37,076 (Nov. 22, 1974), when he sought to amend
it. Even Senator McClellan’s amendment returning to the common law began by
referencing the “credibility of a witness.” Id. (reporting the amendment, which passes at 120
CONG. REC. 37,083 (Nov. 22, 1974)).
There is some evidence that the drafters were particularly concerned with providing an
asymmetrical rule in criminal cases, which is to say that the defendant could not be impeached
(if he or she survived the balancing rule), although the government’s witnesses (i.e.,
confidential informants) could be impeached. To decide Bock Laundry, which was a civil case,
however, one did not need to resolve that question: focusing on civil cases alone is a far more
parsimonious and restrained approach than the one chosen by the Justices, each of whom
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conference report alone.131 If this is right, one can hardly say that the most
relevant legislative history is too heterogeneous or voluminous: after culling
the fourteen-page conference report and joint explanation, the sections on Rule
609 amount to less than two pages.132
Perhaps most importantly, emphasizing the statutory history focuses the
interpreter on the proper texts. In Bock Laundry, none of the Justices paid much
attention to the fact that both houses passed text applying to civil cases, with
each house beginning its proposed Rule 609 with precisely the same language:
“[f]or the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness.” As in Public
Citizen, a member who reads the conference text is entitled to believe, under
Congress’s own rules,133 that any language added in conference does not

131.

132.

133.

implicitly or explicitly tried to resolve the rule’s application not only to Green’s particular “civil
plaintiff” situation but also in a variety of criminal cases (i.e., prosecution witnesses).
For a different case in which the majority ignores the procedural sequence of events, see
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995). Justice Ginsburg explains this in her dissent,
noting that although the “House Report No. 85 affords support for the reading advanced by
the Court, it predates the Conference Report.” Id. at 600 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For
the rules governing conference reports in the current Congress, see SENATE RULES, 112th
Cong., supra note 97, R. XXVII (2a), at 52; and HOUSE RULES, 112th Cong., supra note 97, R.
22(9), at 37.
H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 9-10 (1974) (Conf. Rep.) (joint explanation of changes to Rule
609). Although the conference report refers to the term “defendant,” there are far more
references to witnesses and parties. See id. at 9 (“The House bill provides that the credibility
of a witness . . . . The Senate amendment providing that a witness’ credibility . . . .”); id.
(“The Conference Amendment provides that the credibility of a witness, whether a
defendant or someone else . . . .”); id. (“prejudice to a witness other than the defendant”);
id. (“the danger of prejudice to a nondefendant witness”). In subsection (b), which covered
the age of convictions, the joint explanation focuses on parties. Id. at 10 (“The Conference
adopts the Senate amendment with an amendment requiring notice by a party . . . in order
to give the adversary a fair opportunity . . . .”); id. (stating that failure to give notice may
“impair the ability of a party-opponent”). None of these references are limited to criminal
defendants. At one point in the joint explanation, it is clear that the authors are using the
term “accused” to stand in for the much larger category of witness or party. No one doubted
that the rule would permit impeachment of all witnesses and parties if the crime was one of
false statement (crimen falsi), and yet this rule was described in the joint explanation as
covering any crime “bearing on the accused’s propensity to testify truthfully.” Id. at 9.
For the rules, see supra notes 97-99. If the drafters were following the rules, they could not
change the first part of the statute regarding “the credibility of a witness,” since that
language had been passed by both houses of Congress. See supra text accompanying notes
97-104 (arguing that Congress violated its own rules in Public Citizen if it added significantly
new material at the conference stage). The conferees may have tried to provide a special rule
for criminal defendants. The conference report “legislative history” (the “joint explanation”)
does not resolve the question but does show that conferees were not terribly precise. They
used the term “defendant” as a proxy for “all witnesses” and “all parties,” as well as used the
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substantially change agreed-upon terms. This puts the emphasis on agreedupon texts—here, “credibility of a witness.”134 None of the opinions put much
emphasis on that text, however, focusing instead on the term “defendant.”135
However one wants to resolve that conflict, and there is a clear conflict in Bock
Laundry absent from Public Citizen, one should be aware that a conscientious
member reading the conference text and recognizing a conflict was entitled to
read it and resolve doubts in favor of what both houses passed—a bill that
covered all witnesses.136
2. United Steelworkers v. Weber
The failure to follow the Principle of “reverse sequential consideration”
mars some of the most significant statutory interpretation cases ever decided.
Roaming around in legislative history with no appreciation for congressional
procedure is an entirely bipartisan affair, affecting liberal and conservative
judges alike, as well as those inclined toward various theories of statutory
interpretation, including purposivism and textualism. The case need not
involve conference reports or the rules governing them, but a simple
recognition of the basics of congressional procedure. These rules may not only
aid those judges who rely upon legislative history but also help textualists
seeking the key text.

134.
135.

136.
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narrower term “accused.” See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 9-10 (1974) (Conf. Rep.); supra
note 132 (quoting from the joint explanation).
See supra note 129 for the text of bills as passed by the House and Senate.
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-10, 520-21 (1989) (majority opinion
by Stevens, J.); id. at 528-29 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 533-34 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(all focusing on the term “defendant”).
As William Eskridge has pointed out to me, the conferees might have compromised in many
ways, including a resolution that kept the common law rule (no balancing for felony
impeachment) for everyone but criminal defendants. That argument suffers from two
objections from the perspective of a faithful member of Congress. First, it is politically
implausible: Why would a member of Congress give a benefit to the least desirable citizens
(criminal defendants) that he or she would not give to civil plaintiffs and defendants?
Second, it is rule-inconsistent: faithful members of the conference had to begin with the
language both houses passed (which covers all witnesses). The real problem here was a
salience effect: the political fight was over criminal defendants. Once the conferees
compromised on that, they either forgot the question of civil case coverage, or they had no
time to iron out any potential ambiguities with the first part of the statute (i.e., “the
credibility of a witness” passed by both houses). A faithful member of Congress, under the
rules, was entitled to read the new language (“defendant”) as consistently as possible with
the language passed by both houses (“witness”), which would suggest a reading that would
harmonize the two, rather than one that focused solely on the term “defendant.”
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Consider the opinion in United Steelworkers v. Weber, an exceedingly
significant discrimination case. The question was whether a private company
and its union could use a voluntary affirmative action plan to rectify a
“conspicuous racial imbalance” in the workforce.137 Until 1974, the company
had only hired white persons for skilled craft positions. As a result, less than
two percent of the skilled craft workers in the plant were African American.138
The affirmative action agreement reserved for African Americans fifty percent
of the openings in newly created craft training programs.139 Brian Weber, who
was white, brought suit claiming racial discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.140
The majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan, acknowledged that Title
VII barred discrimination “because of” race under sections 703(a) and (d),141
and that the law prohibited discrimination against “whites as well as blacks.”142
Nevertheless, the majority rejected this language as based on too “literal” an
interpretation, reasoning that the purpose of the Act was primarily concerned
with voluntary efforts at racial integration of blacks into America’s
workforce.143 A number of scholars have considered Justice Brennan’s opinion
seriously flawed.144 As Philip Frickey once explained: “With all due respect for
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143.
144.

United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979).
Id. at 198.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 199-200.
Section 703(a) provided that it was an “unlawful employment practice for an employer” to
“discriminate against any individual with respect to his . . . employment, because of such
individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). Section 703(d) provided that it was an
“unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labormanagement committee . . . to discriminate against any individual because of his race . . . in
admission to . . . any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
Weber, 443 U.S. at 201.
Id. at 202.
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 69, at 101 (“But many of the commentators agree with Justice
Rehnquist that the Court [Justice Brennan’s opinion] ‘changed’ the meaning of the statute
by judicial fiat, and ‘[t]hat change goes to the roots of the bargain struck by the 88th
Congress, and the roots of our color-blind aspiration.’” (quoting Bernard Meltzer, The
Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment, 47 U.
CHI. L. REV. 423, 456 (1980))); see also Philip P. Frickey, Wisdom on Weber, 74 TUL. L. REV.
1169, 1181 (2000) (characterizing Justice Brennan’s “apparent admission” that the statute
was “unambiguous in Weber’s favor,” as requiring “the judicial Heimlich maneuver of the
Holy Trinity move to dislodge text supposedly choking the spirit out of the statute” (internal
citations omitted)); George Schatzki, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber: An Exercise
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Justice Brennan, . . . the opinion is a failure: it so lacks persuasive methodological
power as to raise questions . . . about the Court’s candor . . . .”145 In dissent,
Justice Rehnquist engaged in an extraordinarily lengthy legislative history of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act146 in an opinion that has been praised by scholars
such as Professor Frickey who nevertheless disagree with Justice Rehnquist’s
result.147
In fact, under the Principles I propose, Professor Frickey’s methodological
critique misses the mark. Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, like Justice Stevens’s
opinion in Bock Laundry, demonstrates how not to read legislative history.
Justice Rehnquist cites legislative history that is the equivalent of confusing
pleadings for jury instructions. For example, the opinion begins its analysis of
the legislative history by emphasizing that sections 703(a) and (d) were
included in the early House bills.148 As a matter of congressional procedure,
this is entirely irrelevant if later amendments changed the bill in ways limiting
or clarifying these provisions. That is the core problem in the case: section
703(j),149 the most relevant provision, was added in the Senate prior to
cloture150 and specifically aimed to counter concerns that companies would be
required to impose racial quotas in hiring. Section 703(j) says that nothing in
the bill was to “require” preferential hiring.151
From this rather inauspicious beginning, Justice Rehnquist’s treatment of
the legislative history continues on its otherwise irrelevant course. The opinion
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in Understandable Indecision, 56 WASH. L. REV. 51, 67 (1980) (criticizing Justice Brennan’s
opinion for overstating “enormously the meaning of the legislative history”).
Frickey, supra note 144, at 1177.
Weber, 443 U.S. at 231-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Frickey, supra note 144, at 1183 (“[T]here was force to Justice Rehnquist’s heated assertions
that the majority opinion was an example of Orwellian doublespeak . . . .”); id. at 1195
(arguing that “Justice Rehnquist had the better of those arguments,” in reference to
arguments based on “statutory text and legislative intent”).
Weber, 443 U.S. at 231.
Section 703(j) provided that nothing contained within Title VII required an employer or
union to “grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of . . .
race . . . in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race . . . in
any community, State, section, or other area.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2006).
Cloture was voted on June 10, 1964, see 110 CONG. REC. 13,327 (1964); section 703(j) is
reprinted in the precloture bill at 110 CONG. REC. 13,315 (1964). STANDING RULES OF THE
SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 88-1, R. XXII, at 24 (1963) (providing for the closing of debate upon a
vote of (then) two-thirds of the Senate present and voting).
110 CONG. REC. 13,315 (1964) (reporting substitute bill including section 703(j)). The
original bill was H.R. 7152, 88th Cong. (1963).
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cites a separate “Minority Report” put forth in the House.152 Again, relying
upon committee reports penned long before a bill has been debated and, more
significantly, amended can be perilous; this House report appeared many
months prior to the addition of section 703(j).153 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist’s
reliance on “minority views” is particularly weak. One cannot find a
congressional decision if one looks only at statements from those who opposed
the bill. (As we will see, under the Fourth Principle, losers’ history cannot be
taken as “authoritative” lest a court enshrine a filibustering minority’s will into
law.)154 This error is compounded by long discussions of the House debate.155
Even the House sponsors of the bill knew it would be significantly changed in
the Senate.156 Because of the importance of the filibuster, the Senate debate
trumps the House on matters of text added in the Senate. Put bluntly, House
members could not possibly have debated section 703(j) because it had not yet
entered the bill.
Justice Rehnquist’s treatment of the Senate debate is better than that of the
House, but suffers again from lack of attention to congressional procedure. He
begins by explaining: “The Senate debate was broken into three phases: the
debate on sending the bill to Committee, the general debate on the bill prior to
invocation of cloture, and the debate following cloture.”157 This is true, but
unhelpful. The debate on recommital is irrelevant: the motion was defeated158
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443 U.S. at 231 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 1 (Nov. 20, 1963).
In the text, I have criticized a well-known conservative Chief Justice. There is no reason to
believe, however, that this practice is a partisan affair. Losers’ history can be found in the
opinions of well-known liberal judges as well. Compare Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S.
Forest Serv., No. 80-3374 (9th Cir. May 14, 1981) (rejecting the statement of the Senate
author of a bill’s nationwide application for a House member who opposed that
interpretation), withdrawn, 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981), as reprinted in ESKRIDGE ET AL.,
supra note 69, at 1027, with Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951 (the
same judge reversing the original decision based on a conference report on a different bill).
For a fuller list of such cases, see infra note 218.
See 443 U.S. at 232-34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 69, at 7 (noting how Representative Bill McCulloch only
agreed to support the 1964 Civil Rights Act based in part on a promise that the Kennedy
Administration would not “water down the bill” in the Senate). This kind of anticipation
does not undermine my argument that, as a general rule, when electoral incentives
(constituents) demand it, the electoral effect may dominate the anticipation effect. See infra
Part IV. In this case, the electoral payoffs for members of the House were aligned with their
anticipation of the actions of other institutions.
Weber, 443 U.S. at 235 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Senator Morse moved to refer the bill to the Judiciary Committee, 110 CONG. REC. 6454-55
(1964), but the motion was tabled, id. at 6455. See id. at 6442 (statement of Senator Long
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and those supporting the motion opposed the bill, attempting to use the
procedural move of sending it back to committee to delay its passage. The
general debate prior to cloture, including various memos written by the
supporters of the Act and the Justice Department, is better than the motion to
recommit, but is hardly the “last act.” It precedes the central act of any Senate
drama: cloture. Cloture is almost always preceded by a “substitute” bill whose
provisions are different from the bill as introduced; provisions must be added
to assuage opponents and produce a supermajority coalition. In this case, the
pre-cloture debate did not include the central provision at issue: section 703(j),
which speaks directly to the question of quotas, was added in the substitute
bill, trumping prior text.
Justice Rehnquist’s treatment of the Senate is at its most persuasive when
he cites post-cloture159 statements from the Act’s proponents, who made
statements against quotas and repeatedly asserted that the bill would not permit
discrimination.160 In particular, a post-cloture statement by Senator Muskie
addressing section 703(j) specifically supported Justice Rehnquist’s point that
section 703(j) clarified and should trump sections 703(a) and (d).161 This
discussion is marred, however, by the repeated invocation of legislative
statements of those who opposed the bill. In short, Justice Rehnquist’s opinion
would have been much stronger had it been a good deal shorter, focused on the
text of section 703(j), and followed the rules of congressional procedure.
Focusing only on the most relevant legislative history may well have reduced
his account to a few pages.
Meanwhile, Justice Brennan, much criticized for his opinion’s failure to
attend to text, managed to stumble onto the key statutory provision, section
703(j).162 Unfortunately, he could have made more of this provision by arguing
that section 703(j) trumped the earlier provisions in the bill, sections 703(a)
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explaining that those who sought to send the bill back to committee were only seeking
delay).
There is also a good bit of damning evidence in the pre-cloture debate that supports Justice
Rehnquist, but, as even he notes, this debate quieted down substantially after the insertion
of section 703(j). This suggests that section 703(j) resolved the problem. Of course, the
“problem” itself may remain contested; Justice Brennan would argue that the problem was
the federal government requiring a racially balanced workforce, and Justice Rehnquist would
argue that it was any racially balanced workforce, “voluntary” or not.
The problem of textual interpretation finds itself repeated in these statements: some
supporters are using the term “discriminate” to refer to any difference in treatment and
others are using it to refer to differences in treatment caused by prejudice against minorities.
See Frickey, supra note 144, at 1179-80 (discussing this essential ambiguity in the term).
443 U.S. at 247-48 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 204-07 & nn.5-7 (majority opinion).
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and (d). Not only is section 703(j) more specific on the question of quotas, but
it is also the “last act”163 necessary to yield a supermajority consensus. Section
703(j) says nothing about “voluntary” affirmative action, focusing instead on
the precise objection made by opponents: that the bill would not “require”
employers to racially balance their workforces. Whatever one thinks about the
majority’s result, at least for purposes of recognizing the key text, Justice
Brennan’s opinion fares far better than the much-admired Rehnquistian
wanderings through the legislative forest, which differ very little in this sense
from Justice Stevens’s wanderings in Bock Laundry.
My point is to assess methodology and, on that score, it seems fairly clear
that the conventional academic wisdom about the Weber opinions is overstated.
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion should not be held up as a model even if one likes
his result, and Justice Brennan’s opinion is not as much of a failure as many
have supposed even if one does not like his result. As we have seen above with
Bock Laundry, reading the legislative history in reverse goes a long way toward
limiting the history relevant to a provision. More importantly, this analysis
suggests that an understanding of congressional procedure is important not
only for those who seek the purpose of a bill (for example, Justice Brennan), but
also for those who focus on the most relevant text.
C. Third Principle: The Best Legislative History Is Not Identified by Type, but by
Specificity to the Interpretive Question and Proximity to the Textual Decision
It is often asserted that some kinds of legislative history are inherently
better than others: committee reports are better than author statements, and
author statements are better than the statements of hearing witnesses.164 Some
scholars have asserted a de facto hierarchy of reliability when it comes to
legislative history.165 In fact, as Professor Vermeule has written, this hierarchy
is “poorly theorized.”166 The standard hierarchy is not only under-theorized, it

163.
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The “last act” was the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute introduced first in May, and later
amended on June 10, 1964, the date cloture was invoked. That substitute included section
703(j). See 110 CONG. REC. 13,315 (1964). The Senate bill was later accepted by the House;
there was no conference.
See generally George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other “Benign Fictions”: The
Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History,
1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 41-42 (recounting the standard hierarchy).
ESKRIDGE, supra note 84, at 222 (presenting proposed hierarchy based on the 1982 Supreme
Court).
Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of
Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1880 (1998).
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is wrong as far as its judgments about reliability.167 The best legislative history
should not be defined by essentialist category, such as the category of all
committee reports or all floor statements. Instead, the best legislative history is
the last, most specific decision related to the interpretive question prior to the
textual decision.168 Note that this Principle is not simply a repetition of the
Second Principle, which privileges later decisions over earlier legislative
history, all other things being equal. Specificity and proximity need not be
conjoined; for example, there may be cases where the most specific legislative
history on the issue appears earlier rather than later in the process, as, for
example, when a committee report speaks directly to the question being
litigated.
That the best legislative history is the history most proximate to text, rather
than a particular type of report or statement, might seem banal.169 Others have
noted this phenomenon, for example, in canonical cases such as Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States.170 Justice Scalia has made this case famous for his
claim that text, not legislative history, must govern.171 The question was
whether alien-labor legislation governing “labor or service of any kind” applied
to a rector from England.172 Reviewing the legislative history, Professor
Vermeule is clearly right in concluding that an early report cannot be
“authoritative history.”173 Professor Vermeule is clearly right in concluding that
such a report cannot be “authoritative” history because no decision was in fact
made. The committee report on which Justice Brewer relied was simply too far
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For example, in the standard hierarchy, committee reports are given great weight, see
Costello, supra note 164, at 43, but decision theory suggests that this may be untrue if the
text has been significantly modified after the report.
Professor Vermeule, supra note 166, at 1874, suggests that courts may overvalue “legislative
history documents that are not themselves legally operative.” Id. In fact, I think the opposite
is likely to happen since courts tend, today, to look for “purposes,” and so they tend to
gravitate toward general statements. It is possible that some specific sources should be
rejected because they violate the rules set out here—either by violating the Third Principle
(proximity) or the Fourth Principle (losers’ history)—but if one is looking for a decision,
rather than an intention or a purpose more generally, specificity should count in favor of,
not against, legislative history.
Positive political theorists have applied rules of temporality and relevance in their analyses
of specific legislation. See, e.g., Rodriguez & Weingast, New Perspectives, supra note 12, at
1500-01 (arguing that the Clark-Case memorandum “cannot be considered a definitive
illumination of the intent of the framers” of Title VII because it was “prepared before the
introduction of the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute” (emphasis omitted)).
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
SCALIA, supra note 21, at 17.
Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458.
Vermeule, supra note 166, at 1843-44.
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in advance of the ultimate debate.174 Bills change dramatically over time, and in
fact the Alien Contract Labor Act was amended after that report was issued.175
One should always be cautious in asserting that committee reports are
necessarily better than author statements or amendment debate. Of course, if
the committee report refers to a decision on the particular matter, and is
roughly contemporaneous in time, then that may be the relatively best
legislative history available.176
A proximity and specificity rule not only helps to ensure reliability, but it
may also whittle down vast amounts of legislative history. For example, return
to Green v. Bock Laundry.177 Does one really need to know the Luck doctrine, the
ABA drafts, or even the prior House and Senate floor debates to resolve the
case—after one looks at the competing statutes and recognizes that a one-anda-half page conference report governs? Return to Public Citizen.178 The prior
history of an executive order and various reports may be enlightening on subtle
issues, but these reports are irrelevant where there is a proximate conference
report. Even if one were to come out entirely differently in these cases, the
legislative history was a good deal simpler than portrayed by the Court.
Conference reports, because of temporal sequence, trump prior legislative
history if they speak to the issue and, in each of these cases, the disputed
language was added at conference.

174.
175.

176.

177.
178.

Id. at 1845.
VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 96-97 (describing how the committee report was attached to a
bill that died in the first session of the 48th Congress and that in the second session of that
Congress “other amendments” were made to “critical sections” of the bill).
See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989). In Blanchard, the question was whether
a contingent fee agreement would cap attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Court
relied upon a Senate committee report proximate to the floor debate, which spoke to the
question of contingent fee agreements, at least to the extent of citing district court cases on
that topic. Id. at 91-92. The Senate report, S. REP. NO. 94-1011 (1976), dated June 29, 1976,
was the most specific committee report on the issue, see id. at 6, but not the last report, see
H. REP. NO. 94-1558 (1976), which was dated September 15, 1976. Nor was the committee
report the “last act” on the bill, as there was a debate in the Senate, a filibuster, 122 CONG.
REC. 31,471, 31,487 (Sept. 21, 1976) (filing a cloture motion), more debate from September
21, 1976 through September 27, 1976, 122 CONG. REC. 32,383, 32,388, 32,394, 32,405 (Sept. 27,
1976), followed by House acceptance of the Senate bill after debate, 122 CONG. REC. 35,578
(Oct. 1, 1976). To determine whether the committee report should control, one would have
to review this evidence.
490 U.S. 504 (1989).
491 U.S. 440, 452-54 (1989).
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Reading legislative history in reverse, coupled with a specificity rule, may179
make even the longest debates180 manageable if, for example, the change was
made in an amendment on the floor, either in the House or Senate. We have
already seen this in Weber, but other cases reveal just how proximity may affect
both legislative history and the relevant text.
Suppose that one is looking for the legislative history of the intelligencetesting provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, in particular how those testing
provisions should affect the decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.181 Griggs is
conventionally known as a “disparate impact” case, although that term did not
exist at the time it was decided.182 The issue in Griggs was, in part, whether coal
handlers (among others) were to be subject to various intelligence tests.183 The
company, Duke Power, argued that its testing was protected by the Tower
amendment, which authorized any professionally designed ability test “that is
not ‘designed, intended, or used to discriminate because of race.’”184 The
EEOC had issued regulations providing that any test had to be “job-related.”185
One might think, if one were reading the legislative record from start to finish,
that it would be nearly impossible to find the history of such provisions; so
many reports, so much testimony, so much filibuster.
A computer-generated summary of the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act is divided into four parts and covers eighty-eight screen pages.186 In
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My claim here is not that such a reading always makes this task easier but only that the
interpreter should first check whether the conference report speaks to the issue in the case. If
not, then one will have to go to the debate on the conference report, then if that is not
relevant, to the debate to determine whether there was an amendment, and to any
committee reports, to find where the precise language entered the relevant bill.
See, for example, the debate about the Civil Rights Act of 1964. CHARLES & BARBARA
WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
(1985).
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1239-40 (4th Cir. 1970), rev’d in part, 401
U.S. 424 (1971).
As can be seen from my analysis, one need not reach a conclusion on so-called disparate
impact based on my interpretation of this particular case. Section 703(j), which is the subject
of the later, and much more controversial Weber case, is effectively trumped in “testing”
situations by the more specific language of section 703(h), since section 703(j) was in fact
included in the substitute negotiations, prior to the insertion of the Tower amendment’s
refashioning of section 703(h).
401 U.S. at 427-28.
Id. at 433.
Id.
See WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (follow “Directory” hyperlink; then follow “U.S.
Federal Materials” hyperlink; then follow “Legislative History” hyperlink; then follow “US
GAO Legislative Histories” hyperlink; then enter “88-352” in the “Public Law No.” search
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fact, if one hones in on the text at issue, the relevant legislative history reduces
to about two to three pages in the Congressional Record.187 To know how to
narrow the field, one must know the rules governing legislative procedure. If
one knows the bill has been filibustered,188 then one looks in the Congressional
Record for the cloture petition. Typically, the cloture vote will be immediately
preceded by the introduction of a “substitute package” incorporating the
provisions necessary to yield a supermajority coalition, and substituting new,
compromised language for any prior bill.189 If the amendment was debated
after cloture, then, by definition, it is unlikely to have been important enough
to obtain a sixty- (or, then, a sixty-seven-) vote coalition; it may have been
trivial to the deal, of interest only to a distinct geographic or other minority, or,
in effect, a relitigation of issues already addressed in the substitute. Those who
filibuster a bill have an incentive, under the rules, to revisit the issues they lost
in the “substitute” negotiations: bill opponents do not care about wasting time,
have every incentive to test whether negotiators have represented the views of
the entire body, and may suggest redundancy or ambiguity by adding new
language, allowing further litigation in the judicial system.190

187.
188.

189.
190.

box) (last visited Aug. 20, 2012). The number eighty-eight is the sum of Part 1 (twentyseven screens), Part 2 (twenty-six screens), Part 3 (nineteen screens), and Part 4 (sixteen
screens).
110 CONG. REC. 13,503-05, 13,724 (1964).
One may wonder why I have placed so much emphasis on the Senate when we have a
bicameral system; the answer is that the Senate’s procedures, including its
supermajoritarian filibuster, are ordinarily far more onerous a burden than the House rules.
“[F]ilibuster threats are an everyday fact of life, affecting all aspects of the legislative
process.” BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING 5 (4th ed. 2012). As Professor
Sinclair writes: “The Senate is not a majority-rule chamber like the House. In the House the
majority can always prevail; in the Senate minorities can often block majorities.” Id. at 50.
WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note 82, at 10 (2006) (“The Senate’s rules that protect
unlimited debate . . . effectively require supermajorities for the passage of legislation . . . .”).
This does not undercut my later claim, in Part IV, about game theory and Congress’s
general lack of attention to judicial precedent. In this case, electoral and anticipatory
interests are aligned; if you oppose a bill, you have electoral reasons to do so; those electoral
reasons give you an incentive to create ambiguity that may allow your preferred outcome to
be reached in the courts.
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In the case of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the major compromise text191
agreed to prior to cloture was the Mansfield-Dirksen “substitute.”192 Senator
Tower, an avowed opponent of the bill,193 introduced his testing amendment
after cloture was invoked. Like most post-cloture amendments, the debate is
short (as the parties are exhausted by a rather lengthy debate, and their
positions are likely to be known on issues being “revisited”): it occupies two to
three pages of the Congressional Record (excluding the material that Senator
Tower inserted into the record from the Illinois employment board Motorola
decision194). The original amendment,195 which added a new section to the law,

191.

192.
193.
194.
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WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 180, at 175 (“[T]here would be no final agreement with
Dirksen [on amendments] until a quid pro quo—the minority leader’s agreement to work
actively for cloture—had been obtained.”). Dirksen introduced a substitute with his
amendment in May, id. at 185; these amendments were debated and a final pre-cloture
package introduced on June 10, prior to the cloture vote, id. at 197-98. The substitute’s
provisions on Title VII, the employment title, appear at 110 CONG. REC. 13,314-18 (1964);
the provisions at issue in Griggs appear at 110 CONG. REC. 13,314 (1964).
On the importance of the substitute in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, see Rodriguez & Weingast,
New Perspectives, supra note 12, at 1473.
110 CONG. REC. 13,320-22 (1964) (statement of Sen. Tower objecting to cloture).
In Motorola, a hearing examiner in Illinois ruled that a general ability test in considering
applicants for assembly-line jobs was discriminatory on the theory that the test was unfair to
“culturally deprived and . . . disadvantaged groups.” Myart v. Motorola, Inc., No. 63C-127
(Ill. Fair Emp’t Practices Comm’n Feb. 27, 1964), reprinted in 110 CONG. REC. 5662, 5664
(1964) (reprinting the text of Motorola and a letter from the executive director of the Illinois
Fair Employment Practices Commission).
The first Tower amendment was offered post-cloture on June 11, 1964. 110 CONG. REC.
13,492 (1964) (Amend. No. 605). It provided as follows:
On page 35, after line 20, insert the following new subsection:
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to give any professionally developed
ability test to any individual seeking employment or being considered for
promotion or transfer, or to act in reliance upon the results of any such test given
to such individual, if—
(1) in the case of any individual who is seeking employment with such
employer, such test is designed to determine or predict whether such
individual is suitable or trainable with respect to his employment in the
particular business or enterprise involved, and such test is given to all
individuals seeking similar employment with such employer without regard
to the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or
(2) in the case of any individual who is an employee of such employer, such
test is designed to determine or predict whether such individual is suitable or
trainable with respect to his promotion or transfer within such business or
enterprise, and such test is given to all such employees being considered
for similar promotion or transfer by such employer without regard to the
employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
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was rejected, and later Senator Tower offered a revised amendment agreed to
by voice vote.196 Having failed once, Tower and Humphrey compromised on
the language ultimately adopted; the final amendment did not add a new
section, but was inserted into existing compromise language covering bona fide
merit systems.197
If one wants to look for the legislative history, even in the longest of
debates, one can do it fairly easily if one focuses on the text at issue, knowing
the sequential process by which bills are considered. And yet, all of the judges
who participated in this case reached out to a variety of provisions, including
the general purposes of the bill, various memoranda prepared before the last
Mansfield-Dirksen substitute, and other materials.198 In doing this, they
actually missed what should have been a “smoking gun,” a crystal clear signal
that the Tower amendment was revisiting an issue that had already been the
subject of pre-cloture negotiations in the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute.
Red flags should immediately go up when one notices that the author of
the amendment, Senator Tower, representing the state of Texas, was a
determined opponent of the bill.199 Why does a Texan care about an Illinois
employment board decision that in no way binds Texas? In fact, Motorola had
become a rallying cry long before the Tower amendment was proposed because
Senator Dirksen, the leader of the moderate opposition, represented the State
of Illinois.200 Of course, this raises the possibility that the filibustering
opponent, Senator Tower, was simply trying to win something more than
what Senator Dirksen and his forces had gained in the cloture negotiations.
The Motorola issue was not new. Senator Humphrey, lead sponsor of the
bill, explained this rather colorfully in the brief floor debate: Motorola had been
“discussed, discussed, and cussed.”201 Senator Miller, a conservative

196.
197.

198.

199.
200.
201.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 13,724 (statement of Sen. Tower concerning Amend. No. 952).
Humphrey’s concession here risked ambiguity, but he reduced this risk at the very least by
inserting the language in the relevant section rather than, as in the first amendment, adding
a separate, freestanding amendment. Note that the first amendment, a completely new
section to be inserted into the bill, was to find a home at page 35 of the post-cloture bill. See
110 CONG. REC. 13,492 (1964). The ultimate amendment appeared at page 44. See id. at
13,724.
The Clark-Case memorandum was prepared in April; the final substitute was introduced in
June. For the legislative history relied upon by the judges considering Griggs, see infra note
209.
110 CONG. REC. 13,320-22 (1964) (statement of Sen. Tower objecting to cloture).
I am in complete agreement with the analysis of Rodriguez and Weingast, New Perspectives,
supra note 12, at 1474-88, that Senator Dirksen was pivotal to the compromise.
110 CONG. REC. 13,504 (1964) (emphasis added).
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Midwestern Republican who came late to vote for cloture (and thus is a fairly
reliable source),202 asked Senator Humphrey whether another part of the bill
had been inserted to bar a Motorola-type ruling. Humphrey responded, “That
is correct,” meaning that the bona fide merit system language had been
inserted to respond to the Motorola objection.203 In other words, Senator Miller
was trying to test whether the cloture negotiators had accurately compromised
on the Motorola issue. This is why the proponents’ first objection was not that
the amendment encouraged intentional discrimination by creating a safe
harbor for all professionally developed tests, but that the amendment was
unnecessary204:
MR. MILLER. Is it the position of the managers . . . that the opportunity
and the right to give tests . . . would be authorized under subparagraph
(h) on page 44? The reason I ask the question is that I know something
about the amendment and its reference. I believe that during the
development of the amendment, the question of its not being an unfair
labor practice for an employer to provide for the furnishing of
employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a
system which measures earnings was discussed. Would not a test such
as is covered by the amendment have to be included in the concept of
such a system as I have mentioned?
MR. HUMPHREY. That is correct. That amendment was one that was
added after the original substitute package had been tentatively agreed
upon. We reviewed the entire Motorola case, and then added that
particular section.205
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WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 180, at 190-91 (“Jack Miller, the conservative Iowa
Republican, announced his support for the cloture motion [the Thursday before cloture was
invoked]. Miller had been the target of intense church lobbying . . . . [T]he most decisive
influence of all was the Archbishop of Dubuque . . . who urged Miller, a Catholic and former
Notre Dame University law professor, to support cloture and the bill.”). Senator Miller is a
reliable source because he was not an eager enthusiast of the bill, but one who hung back
with the bill’s filibustering opponents until a compromise had been reached moderating the
bill to obtain cloture. As opposed to winners or losers, moderates have a relatively greater
interest in explaining the bill’s essential compromises.
110 CONG. REC. 13,504 (1964).
Id. at 13,503-04 (statement of Sen. Clifford P. Case) (“I object to the amendment suggested
by the Senator from Texas because . . . it is unnecessary. Discrimination could actually exist
under guise of compliance with the statute.”).
Id. at 13,504.
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One page of debate thus narrows the possible decisions Congress made on
testing. Consider two possible extremes: Congress decided that all testing was
permissible, or Congress decided that no testing was permissible (Motorola).
The first position (all testing) was rejected by the vote on the first Tower
amendment; the second position (no testing) was rejected by all Senators in
the debate on the first Tower amendment.206 This leaves us with an
intermediate category of testing that was not intentional discrimination but
was “used” to discriminate, per the text of the final Tower amendment.207
“Used” obtains a reasonable meaning from its context and significant
placement in the section with the bona fide merit language (which was a
Tower concession in the second amendment, since the first amendment was a
free-standing addition to the bill). Even Senator Tower was willing to accept
“suitability and trainability” in his first amendment, which suggests a broad
recognition in the Senate that merit tests would only be permissible if they
bore some relation to the job at issue.208 The EEOC could reasonably have
relied upon “job-relatedness” as a position agreed upon by both proponents

206.
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Id. at 13,503 (statement of Sen. Clifford P. Case) (“I feel certain that no member of the
Senate disagrees with the views of the Senator from Texas concerning the Motorola case . . . .”).
The second Tower amendment was modified as follows before passage:
On page 44, line 15, insert the following after the word “origin”; nor shall it be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results
of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended, or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
110 CONG. REC. 13,724 (1964). The resulting statute reads:
Seniority or merit system; quantity or quality of production; ability tests;
compensation based on sex and authorized by minimum wage provisions.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards
of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work
in different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and
to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided
that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed,
intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006) (emphases added).
See 110 CONG. REC. 13,492-93 (1964); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436
n.12 (1971) (“This language indicates that Senator Tower’s aim was simply to make certain
that job-related tests would be permitted.”).
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and opponents. Of course, this says nothing about disparate impact as such, for
it simply addresses the narrow question whether an agency, like the EEOC,
had congressional authority to issue such regulations, not whether the
regulations were the best or only interpretation of the statute.
Even if one disagrees with this interpretation, notice that the analysis takes
no grand tour through the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act. It does not
invoke statements of purpose, the Clark-Case memorandum, or other snippets
of history relied upon by proponents or opponents in the Fourth Circuit and
the Supreme Court.209 It simply reads the most proximate and specific
legislative history in light of the cloture rules and the cloture-rule-based
incentives of filibustering minorities. How can two to three pages possibly be
any more complex or difficult than the kinds of administrative records
routinely reviewed by courts today?
D. Fourth Principle: Never Cite Legislative History Without Knowing
Who Won and Who Lost the Textual Debate
In Congress, winning and losing matter.210 Yet scholars and judges feel free
to rifle through the debates, picking and choosing quotations supporting their
interpretive positions. There is nothing partisan in this: so-called liberal and
conservative judges rely on losers’ history and both are wrong in doing so
despite rather ancient and well-known pronouncements against the use of such
history.211 This point has become far more important recently, however,
because of the ubiquity of the filibuster. The point of statutory interpretation
cannot be to look for the position of a filibustering minority. There has been an
enormous hue and cry against judicial activism in the use of legislative history,
but one of the more significant problems is using it improperly. It should be
far clearer that it is “activist” to use losers’ history. Positive political theorists
are correct that losers are likely to exaggerate the limits of a bill, just as winners
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Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434-36 (citing the Clark-Case memorandum, statements of Senators
disagreeing with Motorola, and statements of Senators Case and Humphrey); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1970) (relying on Senator Tower’s
statements with respect to the first failed Tower amendment, the Clark-Case memorandum
drafted two months prior to the amendment, and Senator Humphrey’s statement on the
second amendment passed on June 13, 1964), rev’d in part, 401 U.S. 424 (1971); id. at 1242-43
(Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing the Clark-Case
memorandum and Senator Tower’s statements on the first failed Tower amendment).
See, e.g., SHEPSLE, supra note 7, at 127 (“We think of pure majority-rule legislative choice as
an ‘election writ small.’”).
See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951).
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are likely to exaggerate the advantages of the bill.212 But losers’ history should
generate far more caution: surely the job of judges is not to aid legislative
obstructionists. At the very least, students of the legislative process must be
taught to distinguish between winners’ and losers’ history.
Positive political theorists have urged that winners’ history cannot be
enough and that compromise positions must be taken into account.213 This is
surely true, but it is also true that one cannot find such compromises without
looking at the legislative history and the rules governing it: chunks of text do
not come with an attached footnote saying, “this was a compromise.”214
Perhaps more importantly, Congress’s own rules are the only way to identify
significant decisionmaking points when compromise is essential. The rules tell
us, for example, that conference committees and cloture motions are places
where important compromises must be made for a bill to move forward.
Positive political theorists know these rules and apply them;215 they have
simply forgotten that the average lawyer and judge do not know the rules.
Taking the term “history” literally perhaps, lawyers have a tendency to treat
all legislative statements as having equivalent value. As positive political
theorists recognize, statutes are electoral battles. At the end of the battle,
someone wins and someone loses. Although positive political theorists
emphasize the dangers of winners’ history (and there are dangers), a similar if
not greater risk lies in losers’ history. A court perceived as persistently
narrowing statutes to allow minority objectors to win that which they lost in
Congress is just as likely to be met with congressional backlash as a court
perceived as expanding statutes’ meanings.216 But there is a more serious
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214.

215.

216.

See, e.g., Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox, supra note 12, at 1220 (distinguishing between
cheap talk and costly signaling and explaining that all legislators are subject to these
rhetorical incentives).
E.g., Rodriguez & Weingast, New Perspectives, supra note 12, at 1423 (arguing that turning to
the authors of legislation “can be misleading, as the bill’s authors are typically ardent
supporters who have strategic incentives to expand the meaning of the act”).
Thus, “second generation” textualists now emphasize that texts are the product of “complex
bargains” but, in my view, they should not assume that any particular piece of text is a
compromise or a complex bargain. See Manning, supra note 7, at 1290 (arguing that “courts
risk upsetting a complex bargain among legislative stakeholders if judges rewrite a clear but
messy statute”).
See, e.g., Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox, supra note 12, at 1215 (“The bargaining process
within Congress is structured by a complex set of rules, norms, procedures, and
institutions.”).
Compare Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox, supra note 12, at 1209 (implicitly indicting
purposivism by urging that expansionist reading “of existing statutes by judges inhibits
congressional passage of new progressive legislation”), with William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 348 (1991)
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normative objection to losers’ history. No lawyer would try to pass off a
judicial dissent for a majority opinion; surely this is a more fundamental
problem in statutory construction, or at least one that is a good deal easier to
correct, than the failure to appreciate moderating influences on congressional
bargains.
Unfortunately, despite declarations to the contrary,217 losers’ history is
fairly easy to find in judicial opinions.218 We see it in the Fourth Circuit’s Griggs
opinion: Senator Tower’s statement about the Motorola case during the debate
on the first and losing Tower amendment is used to support the very
proposition that Congress rejected in that amendment.219 We can see it in the
Supreme Court’s Bock Laundry opinion: Justice Stevens relies on statements by
Senator McClellan, even though McClellan’s position lost in conference.220
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(implicitly indicting textualism by arguing that Congress is more likely to overrule textualist
Supreme Court decisions).
See Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox, supra note 12, at 1213 n.23 (citing cases rejecting
opponents’ history).
See, e.g., Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 525 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(chiding the majority for relying upon statements of bill opponents); Bowsher v. Merck &
Co., 460 U.S. 824, 851 (1983) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying
upon statements of an opponent of the bill to construe extent of act); NLRB. v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 85-88 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (relying on opponents
of the bill for the conclusion about whether a statute barred secondary boycotting); Davis v.
Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 964 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citing a party’s citation of language
from a bill opponent’s (Senator Tower) failed amendment), rev’d on other grounds,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889,
891 n.1 (2d Cir. 1971) (citing Senators Russell and Tower, opponents of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, on the Senate’s concern that states play a role in enforcing the Act); see also United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1981) (relying upon the statements of
Representatives Eckhardt and Mikva, whom the court acknowledged opposed RICO, to
support the extent of the statute); Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PITT.
L. REV. 627, 632 (1987) (describing how he voiced his opposition to RICO in “hyperbolic
terms” and that those “remarks have been used ever since as legislative history to prove the
broad scope of RICO”). Obviously, a more careful empirical analysis would be required to
reveal the extent to which this is done on a regular basis.
The Fourth Circuit majority opinion relied upon Senator Tower’s statement for the
proposition that all professionally developed tests were appropriate, but the amendment was
voted down and necessitated a compromise that placed the actual amendment in the bona
fide merit system section of the law. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1234–35
(4th Cir. 1970), rev’d in part, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 516-17 (1989). Senator McClellan had
persistently pushed for the “all felony impeachment” rule for witnesses, which is precisely
what the conference rejected, imposing a balancing test. Id. at 517-18.
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Curiously, Justice Stevens would later claim that the “legislative history” in this
case “altered [his] opinion.”221
Perhaps more disturbingly, we see losers’ history in great scholars’
interpretation of seminal cases. Take, for the example, the debate about the
canonical Holy Trinity case. The law reviews have offered two widely different
interpretations of the legislative history in that case, one by Adrian Vermeule222
and the other by Carol Chomsky,223 neither of whom makes much of a
distinction between losers and winners. Professor Vermeule has argued that
the legislative history of the Alien Contract Labor Act supports Justice Scalia’s
plain meaning interpretation224: the Labor Act says “labor or service of any
kind” and obviously covered a British rector brought to preach in New York.225
Professor Chomsky disagrees, arguing that the legislative history is far more
complex, focusing on corporate en masse importation of slave labor or what
was called at the time “cooly practices.”226 Chomsky emphasizes the parallel
interpretation of the Chinese Exclusion Act as meaning “manual labor” when
the Act used the term “labor.” Since the Supreme Court had already

221.

222.
223.
224.
225.

226.

Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 278 (1996) (“That the
[legislative] history could have altered my opinion is evidenced by the fact that there are
significant cases, such as Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989), in which
the study of history did alter my original analysis.”). In my view, Justice Stevens misread the
conference committee joint explanation when he emphasized that Rule 609 did not cover
nonparty witnesses. The joint explanation makes quite clear that the rule covers witnesses; it
is just that the joint explanation indicated what was not in the statute: that prejudice to the
witness’s own reputation in the community (such as a confidential informant might claim),
as opposed to prejudice to the party offering the witness, was not to be considered.
Vermeule, supra note 166.
Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory
Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (2000).
SCALIA, supra note 21, at 20-21; Vermeule, supra note 166, at 1854-57.
SCALIA, supra note 21, at 19-20. Justice Scalia’s argument is not the only textual argument in
the case. As we have seen for all of our other cases, there are typically two conflicting terms,
rather than a single one, in difficult statutory interpretation cases. The issue in the case was
about not only the meaning of “labor” but also the meaning of the “lecturer” exemption.
Careful readers of the statute have so argued. See Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA,
supra note 21, at 92 (emphasizing the lecturer exemption as part of a constitutional
argument). It is ironic but true that the legislative history helps us see that there are two
texts (“labor” and “lecturer”) and that Professor Tribe’s preferred text has a very plausible
claim to being the way the law was read by the 1885 Congress. As one of the bill’s major
opponents conceded, “People who can instruct us in morals and religion and in every species
of elevation by lectures . . . are not prohibited.” 16 CONG. REC. 1633 (1885) (statement of
Sen. Morgan).
Chomsky, supra note 223, at 929-30 (quoting Senator Blair).
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interpreted similar legislation in a way that would exclude the rector, Congress
did not intend to cover the rector.227
There is much in the legislative history repeating this battle, with the
supporters of the bill insisting that it would apply only to slave-labor-type
importations and the opponents insisting it covered a wide variety of workers.
Indeed, one can see this quite clearly in the following exchange between
Representative John O’Neill of Missouri, labor’s ally, and his interlocutor,
Representative John Adams of New York, cited by both Professors Chomsky
and Vermeule (at least in part). A former store clerk who had gone on to be a
lawyer,228 Adams was curious about how someone like himself might fare
under the bill. He asked O’Neill whether a clerk such as his former self would
be barred from coming to the United States.229 O’Neill said “yes,” if the clerk
would be brought to the United States under the kind of circumstances covered
by the bill’s core prohibition, en masse slave-labor-type conditions.230
Notice that Representative O’Neill is speaking to his political constituents
(the “electoral connection”), and is noticeably annoyed by his opponents’
tendency to focus on “hair-splitting technicalities.”231 Representative O’Neill
clearly cared more about the political victory than the precise terms of the bill,
but no doubt so did his constituents. One can understand this colloquy a bit
better if one recognizes that the bill’s opponents suggested that it was
unconstitutional under a theory—“class legislation”—now largely forgotten232:
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Id. at 927 (“It is difficult to read page after page of this House debate without concluding
that the bill was meant to address the ‘contract labor system,’ the practice by industrialists of
importing large numbers of workers from abroad to take the place of American laborers at
reduced wages, and that this was understood by all legislators considering the bill.”).
Adams, John Joseph, (1848-1919), BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE U.S., http://bioguide
.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=A000040 (last visited Nov. 22, 2011). Adams was
a graduate of Columbia University and a Democrat.
15 CONG. REC. 5358 (1884). The House voted overwhelmingly to pass the bill, 102-17, but
there is no recorded vote so it is impossible to tell whether Mr. Adams actually voted for the
bill. Id. at 5371.
Id. at 5358 (statements of Rep. Adams and Rep. O’Neill); see Vermeule, supra note 166, at
1847 (citing part of this exchange).
15 CONG. REC. 5358 (1884) (statement of Rep. O’Neill).
These objections suggested that drafters were damned if they did and damned if they didn’t.
If they amended the bill to narrow it to a particular “class” of workers, it might invite
constitutional litigation just as it would if they were to expand the exemptions, since
exemptions were the classic trigger for “class legislation” claims. V.F. Nourse & Sarah A.
Maguire, The Lost History of Governance and Equal Protection, 58 DUKE L.J. 955, 972, 987
(2009) (analyzing the origins of “class legislation” arguments).
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MR. O’NEILL, OF MISSOURI. It is not intended by this bill to keep away
skilled mechanics or laborers from coming to the country who come
here voluntarily. It is for the purpose of preventing pauper laborers
from being brought here from abroad for the purpose of breaking
down the efforts of the workingmen of this country to secure their just
rights.
MR. ADAMS, OF NEW YORK. Why do not you insert “day laborers?”
MR. O’NEILL, OF MISSOURI. Because they are not day laborers; they are
liable to work by the week or the month.
Now there is one thing I will refer back to, because I want to bring it to
the ears of this House, that if you mean to protect American labor here
is where you can show your sympathy in the best way.
Never mind about these hair-splitting technicalities with reference to
the bill; but remedy any defects that you believe to exist in it. If we all
had to run as constitutional lawyers, few of us would get elected [laughter],
and remember that what the workingmen ask you to do for them is
simply that this Congress shall give, so far as it can, protection to them
against this infamous contract system.233
The question remains whether, as Professor Vermeule suggests, the
legislative history resolved itself in favor of Justice Scalia’s interpretation, or
did not, as Professor Chomsky writes.234 In favor of his view, Vermeule cites
the following exchange: Senator Morgan protested that the bill was “class
legislation” and “vicious” in that “it discriminate[d] in favor of professional
actors, lecturers, or singers.”235 We no longer remember the constitutional
doctrine of “class legislation,” but the argument is that the bill’s exemption
treats “high class workers” differently from “low class workers,” a common
argument used against labor legislation at the time.236
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15 CONG. REC. 5358 (1884) (emphasis added).
Vermeule, supra note 166, at 1850 (“[T]he Senate had essentially settled the question of the
bill’s scope in favor of coverage of both brain toilers and manual laborers.”). But see
Chomsky, supra note 223, at 927-28 (arguing that the legislative history shows that the bill
was meant to address only the importation of low-wage laborers).
16 CONG. REC. 1632 (1885) (statement of Sen. Morgan).
Nourse & Maguire, supra note 232, at 966 n.43, 967 n.44. At one time, for example, it was
thought that the best argument against the restrictions on working hours at issue in Lochner
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Senator Morgan argued that if the alien “happens to be a lawyer, an artist, a
painter, an engraver, a sculptor, a great author, or what not, and he comes
under employment to write for a newspaper, or to write books, or to paint
pictures . . . he comes under the general provisions of the bill.”237 He continued
later:
Now, I shall propose when we get to it to put an amendment in there. I
want to associate with the lecturers and singers and actors, painters,
sculptors, engravers, or other artists, farmers, farm laborers, gardeners,
orchardists, herders, farriers, druggists and druggists’ clerks,
shopkeepers, clerks, book-keepers, or any person having special skill in
any business, art, trade or profession.238
Senator Blair responded, encouraging his counterpart to observe “that it is
only the importation of such people under contract to labor that is
prohibited . . . . If that class of people are liable to become the subject-matter of
such importation, then the bill applies to them. Perhaps the bill ought to be
further amended.”239
From this exchange, Professor Vermeule explains: “[T]he Senate had
essentially settled the question of the bill’s scope in favor of coverage of both
brain toilers and manual laborers.”240 Professor Chomsky disagrees, arguing
that Professor Vermeule reads the debate selectively since the core agreement
was to ban en masse slave labor.241 Professor Vermeule pauses to note that
Senator Morgan, a Democrat from Alabama, opposed the bill but nevertheless
relies on Morgan’s statements.242 In fact, had he wanted to, Professor Vermeule
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v. New York would be “class legislation,” that the bill affected only one class of workers,
namely bakers. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). This view was based on a number of state cases that had
used similar arguments. Lochner is known, in fact, for rejecting the “class legislation”
argument in favor of one based on “right.” See id. at 974-75; see also Victoria F. Nourse, A
Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of
Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751 (2009) (rejecting claims made by other historians
that Lochner was a “class legislation” decision).
16 CONG. REC. 1633 (1885).
Id.
Id. (statement of Sen. Blair); see also Vermeule, supra note 166, at 1849-50.
Vermeule, supra note 166, at 1850.
Chomsky, supra note 223, at 905-08, 927-28.
Vermeule, supra note 166, at 1849 (citing Senator Morgan’s comments as the meaning of the
bill, one accepted by the statute’s authors). It is one thing if the statute’s authors actually did
accept that meaning, but as can be seen from the actual response, the supporters of the bill
made a standard evasive move when met with this objection from bill opponents: if “that
class of people are liable” to be imported as slave labor, then “the bill applies to them.” Id. at
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could have cited a great deal more evidence that proponents knew their
opponents were reading “labor” in its extensive, legalist sense (all work) rather
than in its contextual, prototypical sense (any labor imported en masse).243 If
we stick to the notion offered by a vast array of proponents (even the reluctant
ones),244 the rector in Holy Trinity was exempt because he did not fit the
prototypical “contract labor” situation (he was not imported in conditions of
the prototypical slave labor contract). As Senator Sherman explained, just after
the exchange quoted above between Senators Morgan and Blair: “What I
intend to vote for when I vote for the bill is to prevent this organized corporate
importation, not of laboring men, but of bought men, to come here and
compete with our laboring men, with our mechanics and miners.”245 Indeed,
even Senator Morgan, the bill’s most ardent opponent, agreed that under the
“lecturer” exemption, a lecturer on religion or morals was not covered.246
If Professor Vermeule does not distinguish statements opposed to the Act
from those supporting it, neither does Professor Chomsky, who is far more
reliant on the legislative history for her argument. Chomsky concludes that

243.
244.

245.
246.

1850 (citing Senator Blair’s response). The point implicit in this exchange is that bill
supporters thought their opponents were raising “technicalities,” eventualities that would
never happen (store clerks imported en masse in the hold of a ship). Supporters wanted the
bill drafted broadly to cover skilled labor (part of the strong impetus for the legislation), but
they were afraid that the narrower the definition, the more likely it would be subject to a
constitutional challenge, just as the opponent Morgan suggested, as “vicious” and “class
legislation.” 16 CONG. REC. 1632 (1885) (statement of Sen. Morgan). Remember that, as
Vermeule himself suggests, it was the bill’s opponents who were urging that the bill covered
all labor and so needed to be amended in ways that its supporters feared. Vermeule, supra
note 166, at 1847 (quoting the Senate committee report for the claim that there was an
“unfriendly” opposition to the bill built upon the notion it was overbroad and needed to be
narrowed to cover only “manual” labor). Even the bill’s opponents, however, were not
consistent in this effort: in urging that the bill was “class legislation,” Morgan argued that
the bill was intended to cover “the ruder sorts of work about the manufacturing
establishments” of the land. 16 CONG. REC. 1632 (1885) (statement of Sen. Morgan).
For the distinction between legalist and prototypical meanings, see Victoria F. Nourse, Two
Kinds of Plain Meaning, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 997 (2011).
See, e.g., Chomsky, supra note 223, at 927 (noting that Representative Kelley objected to the
language but nevertheless supported the “spirit of the bill,” because it protected labor from
“importation of cheap labor in the persons of the worst classes of the least enlightened states
of Europe” (quoting 15 CONG. REC. 5354 (1884) (statement of Rep. Kelley))). For a typical
statement of a proponent, see, for example, id. at 930, which quotes a statement of the
manager of the bill, Senator Blair, claiming that the bill was to “prevent substantially the
cooly practices which have been initiated and carried on to a considerable extent between
America and Europe.” Id. (quoting 16 CONG. REC. 1624 (1885)).
16 CONG. REC. 1635 (1885).
Id. at 1633 (statement of Sen. Morgan).

125

the yale law journal

122:70

2012

it is difficult to read page after page of this House debate without
concluding that the bill was meant to address the “contract labor
system,” the practice by industrialists of importing large numbers of
workers from abroad to take the place of American laborers at reduced
wages, and that this was understood by all the legislators considering
the bill.247
In reaching this conclusion, however, she cites opponents and proponents,
making no distinction between the two. We are treated to statements by
Senators Morgan and Hawley (who voted against the bill) just as readily as by
Senators Blair and Platt (who voted for the bill).248 Her argument would have
been substantially strengthened had she emphasized that those who
persistently complained about the breadth of the Act were in fact opponents of
the bill.249 She might have even dented the armor of those naturally hostile to
legislative history by noting that her favored interpretation narrows the statute’s
domain.
Though neither likely intended it, both Professor Chomsky and Professor
Vermeule appear to give equal weight to congressional statements of losers and
winners. This causes concern about both of their analyses, but it is most
disturbing when we realize that it is possible that scholars are relying for their
interpretations on losers’ history. Certainly, we should not read the legislative
history to adopt the view of one of the bill’s most urgent opponents, Senator
Morgan, that the law was “vicious” and “class legislation.”250 Then why should
his views on the bill’s scope be authoritative? It is not a court’s job to search
out and enforce the position of determined congressional minorities. It is one
thing to suggest that Senator Blair made an important concession when he
stated that perhaps the bill should be amended (although this is rather unclear
in its import since it does not indicate precisely in which way the bill should be
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Chomsky, supra note 223, at 927.
Id. at 930-31 (quoting Senator Morgan); id. at 930 (quoting Senator Hawley); id. at 929-30
(quoting Senator Blair); id. at 933 (quoting Senators Platt); see 16 CONG. REC. 1839 (1885)
(showing that Senators Butler, Groome, Hampton, Hawley, Maxey, Morgan, Saulsbury,
Vance, and Williams voted against the bill).
See, e.g., 16 CONG. REC. 1795 (1885) (statement of Sen. Morgan) (“I think it is one of the
duties of the Senate to make laws that are so plain in their meaning that they can not be
misunderstood.”); id. at 1787-88 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury) (characterizing the bill as
“very sweeping” and “too sweeping”); id. at 1789 (statement of Sen. Maxey) (“[A]ccording
to the first section it applies to every character of labor . . . .”); id. at 1834 (statement of Sen.
Butler) (agreeing with Senator Morgan that the bill was overbroad and would cover
individual contracts).
Id. at 1632 (statement of Sen. Morgan); Vermeule, supra note 166, at 1849.
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amended).251 Without greater support, we cannot say that the majority gave up
its interpretation that the bill covered en masse imported labor (whether the
workers imported en masse were skilled, unskilled, or store clerks), even if the
text of the statute is not so limited. After all, Senator Morgan’s view that the
bill should not have been passed because of its crude drafting did not carry the
day: the Senate vote was a rather lopsided fifty to nine.252
To say that those opposed to the bill should be cited with great caution is
not to say that their statements are irrelevant. Costly concessions, as the
political scientists say, are important: after all, it was the great opponent of the
bill, Senator Morgan, who argued that “lecturers” on religious topics were
excluded from the Act. It is to say that there is a great risk in picking out losers’
history as authoritative history without determining whether it is simply a
reflection of a superminority’s opposition. In Holy Trinity, it means that those
who reject the Court’s outcome based on Senator Morgan’s statements about
the broad scope of the bill risk becoming judicial activists in favor of a
congressional minority. No lawyer would last long at a law firm if he or she
cited the Supreme Court’s dissenting opinions as if they were majority
opinions, but this is precisely the risk when lawyers and scholars cite legislative
history without regard to legislative winners and losers. Both intentionalism
and purposivism tend to exacerbate this problem because they appear to
assume that there will be a unanimous intention when, as Congress’s
procedures make clear, the majority (or in most cases today, a supermajority)
prevails. Indeed, the worst-case scenario—reliance on those who relentlessly
opposed a bill, as in the Fourth Circuit’s Griggs opinion253—raises the risk that
a court may embrace a superminority interpretation held by those who have
filibustered a bill.
An important caveat to this Principle remains: to say that losers’ history
should not be outcome-determinative or authoritative is not to say that it
should be ignored. Minorities’ views may be essential to understanding
changes in textual meaning to provide context in legislative changes,254 or
when their arguments in effect “win.” Indeed, Senator Morgan makes a “costly
concession” (one supported by a textual exception that does win) when he
acknowledges that “lecturers” (exempted in the text) include lecturers on
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See 16 CONG. REC. 1633 (1885) (statement of Sen. Blair).
Id. at 1839-40 (1885).
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1234 (4th Cir. 1970), rev’d in part, 401 U.S. 424
(1971); Nourse, supra note 64, at 1156-62 (explaining the dynamics of the Tower
amendment).
See, e.g., Parker v. Franklin Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 667 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir. 2012) (using
Senator Tower’s attempt to limit the reach of the civil rights bill as an element of context).
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religious topics; this is an admission against interest, contrary to his general
claim that the bill covered all workers, even high-class ones.255 Having said
that, the common lawyerly and scholarly practice of picking statements from
the record without regard to winners and losers should play no part in the best
practices of statutory interpretation, by either soft textualists256 or purposivists.
E. Fifth Principle: Structure-Induced Misunderstandings: Congress’s Rules
May Create Ambiguity for Courts but Not for Congress
We have come to a far more nuanced appreciation of the ways in which
Congress’s rules may defy lawyerly expectations. Let me call these “structureinduced misunderstandings”: cases in which faithful legislators following the
rules may operate under rule-based expectations that contradict what a court
might expect if it looked solely to the text and not the structural context of
Congress’s decision.257
Return to the Public Citizen example and the conference report. When
conferees come to conference, they know that they cannot change text on
which both houses have already agreed. Time is often short,258 and so
conference reports tend to have minimal explanations.259 For example, on
matters for which both bills have the same text, the conferees will have an
incentive, given time constraints, to say nothing about this agreement. Lawyers
reading the reports, however, may read the resulting silence in various ways
inconsistent with this notion of textual agreement. Even though members will
realize silence is likely to mean textual agreement, judges and lawyers tend to
read all sorts of positive meanings into that silence—that it means the
conference did not consider the matter, or that the conference committee
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“People who can instruct us in morals and religion and in every species of elevation by
lectures . . . are not prohibited.” 16 CONG. REC. 1633 (1885) (statement of Sen. Morgan).
By “soft” textualism, I mean those textualists who seek in legislative history a confirmation
of plain meaning. See James J. Brudney, Confirmatory Legislative History, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
901 (2011).
Elsewhere I have described a related, but distinct, phenomenon: structure-induced
ambiguity, a form of ambiguity that is different from and in addition to ambiguity created
by the lack of foresight or by the vagaries of language. Nourse, supra note 64, at 1128-34.
Katzmann, supra note 6, at 655 (“In conference committee, the pressure to come to closure
and produce a law can compromise technical precision.”); see also id. at 686 (quoting Judge
James Buckley of the D.C. Circuit, a former Senator, as saying, “[W]ith time often the
enemy, mistakes . . . are made in the drafting of statutes . . . .”).
SINCLAIR, supra note 82, at 98 (“By the time the legislation gets to conference, many people,
and especially many of the conferees who may well have worked on the bill for months, have
a considerable stake in the legislation’s enactment.”).
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report is ambiguous or unhelpful. The lawyerly readings occur because lawyers
read the legislative history without regard to the relevant context (the bills
passed by both houses).260
We can see this in Bock Laundry’s brief conference report joint explanation.
Full of typographical errors, the explanation was obviously hurried. From a
litigator’s perspective, the legislative history is more ambiguous than the
statute—sometimes the conference report refers to Rule 609 as covering
witnesses, sometimes parties, sometimes the accused, sometimes the
defendant, and even “someone else.”261 At times it appears to distinguish
witnesses as constituting a class other than defendants, and at other times, it
refers to any person testifying, including a defendant, as a witness. To be sure,
the conferees could have been more precise, but the point for our purposes is
that the rules of a conference make legislators assume that they cannot change
the language at the beginning of the statute referring to all witnesses. This
explains the frequent reference to “witnesses” throughout the conference
report.262
The purpose of a conference report’s joint explanation is not to
communicate to the two houses items agreed upon, but those items disagreed
upon. It is not surprising, then, that the report focused at times on issues
involving criminal cases since this is where controversy lay. Such a focus may
have a distorting effect. For example, the conference report used the term
“accused” to refer to a provision that everyone conceded applied to all parties
and witnesses: the impeachment-by-false-statement rule.263 That the conferees
did not write about civil cases or change the “all witness” language at the
beginning of the Rule 609’s text is explained by the conference committee
rules. Conferees have every incentive to be silent on that which is agreed upon
and to focus on that which is in dispute—here, criminal cases. This may,
however, create a misplaced “salience” effect for judges who will see that the
report focuses on criminal cases and think that must be the statute’s domain.
“Structure-induced” misunderstandings do not arise only around
conference reports. For example, reconsider our Griggs example, the case
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See, e.g., Cont’l Can Co. v. Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union, 916
F.2d 1154, 1156 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that the conference report included no reference to
the interpretive question as if this indicates significance or absence of information); id.
(“Section 4203(d)(2), language common to the two versions, was not mentioned in the
Conference Committee’s report.”). To know what the Conference Report’s silence means (if
anything), one must look to the bills passed by the House and the Senate.
H.R. REP. NO. 93–1597, at 9 (1974) (Conf. Rep.).
Id. at 7-12.
Id. at 9.
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interpreting a single amendment by Senator Tower concerning job testing.264
The cloture rules give an incentive for bill opponents to revisit issues agreed to
in the substitute. Today, Senate Rule XXII actually encourages this by
requiring that post-cloture amendments be introduced prior to cloture.265
Given the incentives produced by the rules, proponents of the underlying bill
will always suspect that amendments offered in opposition are efforts to obtain
benefits lost in the major substitute negotiations. Nevertheless, proponents
will want to see the already-filibustered bill move forward, which will give
them an incentive to agree to redundant language. Redundant language raises
no immediate electoral costs to the proponents or opponents, but may be the
subject of very serious inquiry by judges who apply canons of construction,
particularly the canon against surplusage. In such a case, the rules of the Senate
create incentives to create surplusage likely to offend judges’ canonically
induced preference for parsimony.
Consider, finally, another type of rule likely to create “structure-induced
misunderstandings”—those governing appropriations bills. The canonical case
is Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.266 The question was whether the
construction on the Tellico Dam could be halted because it would endanger the
snail darter, an endangered species. The Burger Court held for the tiny fish
against the huge dam on the theory that the Endangered Species Act was
broadly worded and that there could be no “repeal by implication” based on
Congress’s repeated general appropriations for the Tellico Dam.267 This
judicial rule of construction is likely to run contrary to the structure-induced
behavior of House and Senate members. Members operate under “rules [that]
prohibit the inclusion of legislative language in appropriations measures.”268
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See infra text accompanying notes 181-197.
SENATE RULES, 112th Cong., supra note 97, R. XXII(2), at 21 (“Except by unanimous
consent, no amendment shall be proposed after the vote to bring the debate to a close,
unless it had been submitted in writing to the Journal Clerk by 1 o’clock p.m. on the day
following the filing of the cloture motion if an amendment in the first degree, and unless it
had been so submitted at least one hour prior to the beginning of the cloture vote if an
amendment in the second degree.”).
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
Id. at 190 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974)); id. at 192-93.
Bill Heniff, Jr., Overview of the Authorization-Appropriations Process, in CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORIZATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS: HOW CONGRESS EXERCISES THE POWER OF THE
PURSE THROUGH AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION, APPROPRIATIONS, EARMARKS, AND ENFORCING
THE AUTHORIZATION-APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 1, 4 (The Capitol.Net ed., 2010). For
exceptions to the practice, see Robert Keith, Examples of Legislative Provisions in Annual
Appropriations Acts, in CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS, supra, at 43.
Although in 1995, by ruling of the Chair, the Senate appeared to allow certain legislative
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The congressional bar against legislating on appropriations “is derived
from House and Senate rules.”269 The basic principle of the rule keeps textual
authorizing language out of appropriations bills, which may be a list of
numbers. Authorizing committees are separate from appropriating committees.
Authorize all you want, but the ultimate monetary decision will be made by the
appropriating committees. This rule is followed every day in the Senate and the
House, as authorizing committees pursue their part of the division of labor
while appropriating committees pursue theirs. The division of labor between
the committees is preserved against encroachment by committee structure and
sequential referral, but violations are subject to a point of order or floor
objection to the completed bill. However well known are Congress’s attempts
to violate this rule, it remains embedded in the structure of Congress’s
committees and the rules governing floor debate on appropriations bills.
No authorizing Chairperson believes that his or her program will be
funded if the appropriators disagree. As a practical matter, appropriations
chairs are the most powerful members of their respective houses. The
authorizer may try to amend the appropriations bill—but any textual language
put into the bill violates the rule against “legislating” on appropriations and
will subject the bill to a point of order. If, for example, an authorizing
committee wanted to spend money on a war in Afghanistan, Congress could
pass a bill to that effect, and the appropriating committee could completely
undo the effect of that bill by introducing an appropriations measure with no
money for such a war. At that point, the authorizing committee could not seek
to amend the appropriations bill with contravening language, for that would
violate the rules against legislating on appropriations. The sequence of these
procedures from authorization to appropriations means that, as a general rule,
appropriations trump authorizations.

269.

provisions on appropriations (known as the Hutchison precedent), this was overruled in
1999 by the Senate as a whole. S. Res. 160, 106th Cong. (1999).
Heniff, supra note 268, at 1; see HOUSE RULES, 112th Cong., supra note 97, R. XXI(2)(b), at
845 (“A provision changing existing law may not be reported in a general appropriation
bill . . . .”); id. R. XXI(2)(c), at 845 (“An amendment to a general appropriation bill shall not
be in order if changing existing law . . . .”); SENATE RULES, 112th Cong., supra note 97, R.
XVI(2), at 14 (“The Committee on Appropriations shall not report an appropriation bill
containing amendments to such bill proposing new or general legislation . . . .”); id. R.
XVI(4), at 15 (“On a point of order made by any Senator, no amendment . . . which
proposes general legislation shall be received to any general appropriation bill . . . and any
such amendment or restriction to a general appropriation bill may be laid on the table
without prejudice to the bill.”); id. R. XVI(6), at 15 (“When a point of order is made against
any restriction on the expenditure of funds appropriated in a general appropriation bill on
the ground that the restriction violates this rule, the rule shall be construed strictly and, in
case of doubt, in favor of the point of order.”).
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The Supreme Court’s opinion in TVA v. Hill fails to appreciate both the
structure and rules governing appropriations and authorizations.270 The Court
applied a judicial canon against “repeal by implication,”271 which effectively
reversed members’ presumption that appropriations trump legislation.
Elsewhere, the canon against repeal by implication may be both wise and
important,272 but, in this particular case, it reversed the assumptions of those
within the legislative process. As Daniel Rodriguez and political scientist
Mathew McCubbins have argued, the Supreme Court’s assumptions about
Congress were more than “[s]trange”; they defied positive political theorists’
well-honed understandings of the appropriations process.273 What judges see
as ambiguity and lack of deliberation in appropriations matters274 is quite the
opposite for those within Congress. Experts believe that members have every
incentive to and do actively participate in the appropriations process and that
these bills are among the most important and actively deliberated of all bills
Congress passes.275
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437 U.S. 153 (1978).
STEVAN A. TOMANELLI, APPROPRIATIONS LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 30-31 (2003).
Echoing Karl Llewellyn’s view that for every canon there is a counter-canon, see Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How
Statutes Are To Be Considered, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950), there is a counter-canon to
this one: the doctrine of “ratification by appropriation,” by which Congress ratifies by
appropriation “an agency action that may have been questionable” at the time made.
TOMANELLI, supra, at 31. The mere appropriation can signal ratification. Id. at 27-29.
There may be good reason for the use of this canon to control executive abuses of power—
when, for example, the executive branch claims authority based on appropriations that, in
fact, contravene other laws. Special thanks to Dakota Rudesill for pointing out the
difficulties with executive-branch use of the ratification canon.
Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical Construction and Statutory
Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 669,
671 (2005) (remarking upon the appropriations canon’s “impoverished analysis of the
appropriations process,” and concluding that it is “unjustified as a matter of positive
political theory”).
According to Professors McCubbins and Rodriguez, the Supreme Court in TVA mistakenly
believed that “legislatures do not deliberate adequately when they are occupied with
appropriations,” id. at 687-88, and therefore appropriations should not be accorded the
respect of “legislation.” Id. at 688-89. This violates what most political scientists believe
about appropriations: not only are such bills legislation, but also very powerful legislation.
See id. at 689-90, 695-708 (arguing that the Supreme Court in TVA misunderstood and
devalued the appropriations process based on controversial normative and positive
assumptions about Congress).
Id. at 697 (arguing that the stakeholders—members, voters, and interest groups—“are
engaged, active, and participate in the process by which Congress expends money during
the regular appropriations process”); id. (“The institutional design of Congress reflects a

a decision theory of statutory interpretation

In the end, there was no way for the appropriators or authorizers alone to
provide the textual clarity the Supreme Court sought. The Supreme Court
wrote, “There is nothing in the appropriations measures, as passed, which
states that the Tellico Project was to be completed irrespective of the
requirements of the Endangered Species Act.”276 But under House Rule XXI(2)
and Senate Rule XVI(4) (rules that the Court itself cites), neither the
Committee nor the full House could have added legislative text to the
appropriations bill, for that would have been legislating on appropriations,
subjecting the bill to a point of order.277 An appropriations committee cannot
change authorizing legislation—it cannot call up the Endangered Species Act
and amend it, for that is outside the appropriations committee’s jurisdiction; it
would have to go to the authorizing committee to do that. The Court ruled that
the appropriations “Committee[] Report[]” language discussing the dam was
insufficient,278 even though there was nowhere else where the appropriating
committees could express their understanding (short of passing an entirely
new bill outside their jurisdiction).279
The Supreme Court seemed to think that making a clear exception in the
text was simple, but under Congress’s rules, it may not have been easy at all.
The appropriators could not put legislating text in their appropriations bill,
and they could not amend the authorizing legislation. The same was true of the
authorizing committee: it could not amend the appropriations bill with
legislation, and it had no jurisdiction over the appropriations bill. Functionally
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strong interest on the part of all legislators, and particularly the majority party who sets the
congressional agenda, to manage and monitor the critical appropriations process.”).
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978).
See id. at 190-91.
Id. (“Expressions of committees dealing with requests for appropriations cannot be equated
with statutes enacted by Congress, particularly not in the circumstances presented by this
case.”).
See Heniff, supra note 268, at 2 (“The separation between the two steps of the authorizationappropriations process is enforced through points of order provided by rules of the House
and Senate. First, the rules prohibit appropriations for unauthorized agencies and programs
. . . . Second, the rules prohibit the inclusion of legislative language in appropriations
measures. Third, the House, but not the Senate, prohibits appropriations in authorizing
legislation.”); Sandy Streeter, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction, in
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 268, at 29 (noting that
authorization bills and appropriations “perform different functions and are to be considered
in sequence. First the authorization is enacted and then appropriations provides the
funding.”); id. (“The House and Senate prohibit, in varying degrees, language in
appropriations bills providing unauthorized appropriations or legislation on an
appropriations bill. . . . Legislation refers to language in appropriations measures that change
existing law, such as establishing new law, or amending or repealing current law.”).
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speaking, it is as if the Supreme Court was asking Nebraska to pass a law for
Louisiana or vice versa. One might simply say that the Court was forcing the
House committees to compromise, but it was also risking the possibility that,
even if the House committees cooperated, no final legislation would be passed
because of the ever-present risk of a Senate filibuster. Resolving the situation
in TVA was not a matter of a small textual fix but required complex
congressional negotiations because of a structural conflict between two
committees’ plans.
iii. decision theory relative to the alternatives
In Part II, I showed how Congress’s rules should change how we read
statutory text and history. In a sense this should be obvious. Procedural context
matters to courts—so why should it be irrelevant to congressional debate or
text? If we force students to imbibe rules of evidence, civil procedure, and
securities regulation, why not the rules that amount to their representatives’
internal “constitution”? In this Part, I respond to the major practical and
theoretical objections to this approach and place decision theory within the
context of a positive, empirically based theory of legislation.
A. The “It’s Too Complex” Argument
Some legal scholars or judges are quick to say that legislative procedures
are simply too complex for lawyers or judges.280 As Judge Posner once
remarked, most theories of statutory interpretation are not guided by an
“overall theory of legislation.”281 Lawyers and judges would find it “otiose,
impractical and pretentious to try to develop one.”282 Charitably interpreted,
this claim assumes that lawyers do not, and cannot, know anything about
legislative processes. My quarrel is with that assumption. Query whether
House and Senate rules are any more complex than the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence. Lawyers have no problem
tackling the massive Code of Federal Regulations or the General Agreement
on Trade and Tariffs but pale when faced with a document like the Senate rules
that is substantially smaller. I have invoked fewer than a dozen congressional
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See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 113.
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 800, 800 (1983).
Id.
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rules in this Article. Is it really “too complex” or difficult for judges and
academics to learn a dozen congressional rules?283
Others might argue that there really are no rules because Congress’s rules
are not entrenched.284 Congress’s rules may be evaded by unanimous
consent in the Senate or a “special rule” in the House. But these are the
exceptions that prove the existence of the rules. No one claims that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence are not
really rules because Congress does in fact amend them. Standing rules of the
House and Senate do in fact regularize the processes affecting members’ runof-the-mill behavior.285 Just because we have all heard stories about
conference committees including extraneous material286 does not mean that
members do not go to extreme lengths to enforce the rules of conference
committees. For example, on a weekend shortly before Christmas in 2005,
Senators Carl Levin and John Warner temporarily revoked their signatures
on a conference report because House members sought to add extraneous
material.287 This anecdote demonstrates what positive political theorists
embrace: “[L]egislators value the stability in legislative outcomes that flows
from the legislature’s internal structure and procedures . . . .”288
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Professor Vermeule has made a sophisticated argument to the contrary suggesting that
institutional features of the interaction between courts and Congress may, in fact, increase
the level of complexity. Given the limits of space, I do not treat this argument in full, but
simply aim to suggest its limits here. See Vermeule, supra note 166, at 1833.
It is generally agreed that, under the Rules of Proceedings clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.
2, Congress may set its own rules and as a result may abrogate those rules, although under
the rules, doing so would require a two-thirds majority in the Senate. On the entrenchment
question and the Rules of Proceedings clause, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes To
Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19
J.L. & POL. 345 (2003). Bruhl’s piece also shows how Congress has in fact “added” to its
rules through what he calls “statutized rules,” whereby statutes provide various procedures,
such as fast-track procedures for trade agreements. Id. at 346-47.
See, e.g., McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 12, at 716.
One of the classic “folk tales” of conference committees is that members routinely “air drop”
in language that is unavailable to other members. This folk account comes, I suspect, from
the practice involving appropriations bills, which are must-pass legislation and which,
under the Budget Act, are not subject to normal procedures. Even, however, if this were
true, it would provide no reason for a court not to hold Congress to its rules, as one of the
salutary side benefits of such an approach might well be that there would be less
contravention of the rules.
151 CONG. REC. 30,744 (2005) (statement of Sen. Levin) (“Senator Warner and I strongly
objected to a procedure so totally destructive of bedrock legislative process.”).
McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 12, at 716.
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In fact, most of the rules essential to understanding legislative institutions
stem from a simple structurally fixed premise: plurality. How can 535 people
write a brief together without a division of labor (committees devoted to
particular issues), rules for resolving disputes (sequential referral), and
ultimate compromises made (conference committees)? For example, consider
the unwritten rule that “legislative precedent” matters. In voting on bills or
drafting bills, members often look to prior bills so that their policy positions
are consistent over time and, in the case of drafting, so that it is easier to pass
the bill—the author can argue that the bill presents no great change in law, and
it has already passed the relevant legislative body. Just as no written
constitutional rule binds the judiciary to precedent, no written rule binds the
Congress to its prior textual precedents. And yet, textual precedent has a
powerful effect in Congress. Relying on precedent reduces information
costs; it makes decisions easier. This is true of individual judges and
individual representatives as well. Let us say that Representative X has
voted for bill Y for three sessions of Congress. The likelihood is very high
that he will vote for it again; the likelihood is also very high that his staff
will want precisely the same language voted on earlier to avoid the costs of
considering new and unexpected outcomes. Relative to the current
uncoordinated system, one based on Congress’s rules is likely to decrease
complexity and increase simplicity.
B. The “Legislative History Costs Too Much” Argument
One of the more significant arguments against legislative history, akin to
the complexity argument, is that even if legislative history is no more complex
than other areas of law, relative to a focus on the text itself, it increases
litigation costs.289 Some have even suggested that the costs of investigating
legislative history “may . . . tend to skew judicial evaluation in favor of
claims . . . advanced by affluent parties” with greater resources to mine the
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I reject, however, Justice Scalia's view that all judicial use of legislative history is per se
unconstitutional. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 388 (2012) (“[U]se of legislative history is not just wrong;
it violates constitutional requirements of nondelegability, bicameralism, presidential
participation, and the supremacy of judicial interpretation . . . .”). But see VERMEULE, supra
note 6, at 76 (“Our sketchy Constitution, I have argued, cannot plausibly be read, on any
interpretive approach, to dictate rules of statutory interpretation . . . .”); id. at 76-77
(arguing that any appeal to formalism must rest upon system capabilities and empirical
questions). For a response to Professor Manning’s constitutional arguments, see Nourse,
supra note 53.
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legislative record.290 The question remains whether such concerns demand an
exclusionary rule—a rule excluding all legislative history from consideration.291
An exclusionary rule (no legislative history) stance does not necessarily reduce
interpretive costs below those that might be saved by a rule-based decision
theory. As Professor Vermeule has made clear, there is no unified judicial view
on any particular statutory interpretation approach, including a legislative
history exclusionary rule.292 The vast majority of courts still use legislative
history to some extent. Relative to the present practice in which there is no
central agreement upon what counts as reliable legislative history, rule-based
decision theory’s focus on the last decision may render the legislative history
quite manageable. It may well be impossible, as Professor Vermeule has noted,
to assess whether courts make more errors with legislative history than without
it.293 However, relative to a rule of uncoordinated picking and choosing of
legislative history, one that simplifies and objectifies legislative history reduces
costs. It reduces costs by decreasing the amount of relevant legislative history
and increasing the coordination of those courts looking to legislative history.
In theory, rule-based decision theory could even reduce the total
interpretive costs below the level imposed by a strong exclusionary rule,
meaning a rule allowing the interpreter to consider text only. Just as legislative
history is subject to “picking and choosing,” so too is text. As we have seen
above, rule-based decision theory has the effect of focusing on the texts central
to Congress’s decision. Perhaps more importantly, the costs of an exclusionary
rule cannot simply be calculated by what is left out. If a court does not use
legislative history, it uses something else to resolve ambiguity, whether canons
of interpretation, prior precedent, or other statutes, all of which impose
interpretive costs. Such costs can be quite large, as, for example, when a court
canvasses the whole code looking to vast numbers of other statutes.294 In Public
Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, we saw how decision theory made it
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VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 112.
SCALIA, supra note 21; Manning, supra note 7.
VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 119 (“[T]he judiciary, like Congress, is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’ That
mistake produces the critical and erroneous assumption that coordinated judicial adoption
of some particular approach to legal interpretation is feasible and desirable.” (citation
omitted)).
Vermeule, supra note 166, at 1863-65.
See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88-89 & 89 n.4 (1991) (resolving
whether “attorney’s fees” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 include expert fees by comparing § 1988
with a host of other fee statutes, the assemblage of which certainly requires time and
expense).
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unnecessary to either invoke the absurdity doctrine or answer a constitutional
question.295
The exclusionary view also risks a different kind of cost: entrenching the
views of superminorities. Because no text comes with a sign indicating it was
inserted by the majority or the minority, only by looking to the legislative
history can one be certain that one is not embracing a result sought by a
filibustering minority. The best available empirical evidence shows that
textualist decisions tend to be overridden by Congress at greater rates than
non-textual decisions.296 This shows not only that textualism may increase the
cost of legislating but also that textualist decisions could easily reflect the views
of a superminority. This result has an inevitable entrenching effect. Given
congressional inertia and the need for a supermajority to overcome the
inevitable Senate filibuster, losing parties are likely to find it quite difficult to
elicit congressional reversals of erroneous textualist interpretations in cases of
low political salience or where minorities’ interests are at stake. If a rule-based
approach reduces that risk, it may well be less costly than the exclusionary
view, where cost is defined not purely in terms of information costs or judicial
resources, but in the larger normative sense of legitimacy in a democratic order.
As we have seen, although textualism claims to be a majoritarian approach,
there is nothing preventing such an approach from entrenching the will of the
few at the expense of the many. The same is unfortunately true of purposivism,
but here the risk is smaller since purposivists are at least willing to look at
legislative history.
C. The “Let’s Discipline Congress” Argument
A number of scholars have suggested that the problems of ambiguity
would be solved if Congress were simply “punished” when it created
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See supra Section II.A.
Eskridge, supra note 216, at 348 (finding that the Congress is “much more likely to override
‘plain meaning’ decisions than any other type of Supreme Court statutory decision”).
Despite this finding, textualists defend their position by arguing that text is a matter of
finely wrought compromise, see, e.g., Manning, supra note 7, at 1304, but there is no reason
to believe, absent some review of the legislative history, that any particular statutory term is
the subject of a compromise. Indeed, assuming that any particular piece of text is the
reflection of such a compromise appears to be a way to suggest that courts apply the
narrowest possible plain meaning, even if there is no reason to believe that meaning
conforms to Congress’s rules or its decisions. Note, as well, that the narrowest possible
meaning of a repealing statute could in fact increase the quantity of law relative to
Congress’s decision, thus there is no inherent libertarian effect to such a claim.
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ambiguity.297 As Einer Elhauge has written in one of the most sophisticated
forms of this approach, courts should force Congress to reveal Congress’s
preferences more accurately.298 In fact, such judicially imposed default rules are
likely to be unsuccessful. As Professor Vermeule has argued, for such rules to
be effective, judges must agree upon them, and there is no evidence that judges
can or will reach such a consistent agreement.299 More importantly, even if
judges were to agree upon them, they would have to communicate their rulings
consistently to Congress, and Congress would consistently have to “hear”
those rules.300 Outside decisions of wide public notice or application to a
powerful interest group, the empirical evidence suggests that Congress pays
little attention to the internal minutiae of appellate decisions.301 This reflects
the obvious fact that no one ever lost an election by failing to pay attention to
appellate case law. As Judge Robert Katzmann of the Second Circuit, a former
professor and Senate aide, has recently written, it is an “illusion[]” that even a
uniform judicial practice, such as one decrying ambiguity, “will change
legislative behavior.”302
Others have proposed that Congress pass its own federal rules of statutory
interpretation, as Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz has argued.303 If we have rules
of evidence, why don’t we have rules of statutory interpretation? This is an
excellent question, but it is unlikely to incite legislative action by Congress,
particularly given that Congress may view itself as already having such rules.
Congress simply has no incentive to pass new rules in a world otherwise
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Elsewhere, I have argued that there is an irreducible structure-induced ambiguity that
makes such proposals implausible. Nourse, supra note 64, at 1129-34. Only if one were to
change the structure of the body could one reduce this form of ambiguity.
Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting, supra note 23, at 2169-70.
VERMEULE, supra note 6.
Nourse & Schacter, supra note 27, at 619-23 (describing an empirical study suggesting that
Congress does not pay attention to judicial rulings in any consistent way).
See, e.g., Katzmann, supra note 6 (detailing the history of projects to try to keep Congress
informed of appellate decisions and noting that initial efforts revealed that “committee staff
did not know about judicial opinions concerning technical aspects of the statutes under the
committee’s jurisdiction,” although they knew about broad policy decisions that had been
brought to their attention by a “losing party with influence” in Congress). Judge Katzmann
explained efforts since that observation was made and various proposals for change, see id. at
682-94, but offered little positive evidence of results, despite widespread approval by
members of the Congress and the judiciary. Judge Katzmann argues courts should continue
to actively seek “a better understanding of the legislative process and . . . [its] internal
hierarchy of communications.” Id. at 682.
Id. at 680-81.
Rosenkranz, supra note 22.
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crowded with immediate political needs, like jobs or health care. Congress is a
very busy place,304 and statutory interpretation, however important in the
abstract, is likely to garner little attention by representatives waging war,
balancing budgets, and reforming entitlements. Moreover, even if a statutory
rules bill did capture the imagination of a member or senator, it would not be
easily passed because theoretical disputes would soon be associated with larger,
politically salient issues, making it difficult to reach consensus. For example,
rules about textualism and purposivism would be debated in public terms, as
rules of judicial restraint or activism, and this would tend to yield predictable
and large political divisions akin to those we see in Supreme Court nomination
battles. Finally, even if a bill were passed, Congress would soon begin the
process of undoing any compromise, just as it has felt free to “contract around”
the sentencing commission guidelines and pass its own rules of evidence.305
Legislative history by the rules offers significant advantages because it is a
self-enforcing rule of statutory interpretation. Using Congress’s own rules
allows judges to apply the interpretive presumptions of a faithful congressional
decisionmaker, hurdling the barriers of coordination and communication
associated with competing proposals.306 It might also have the salutary side
benefit, if it were to communicate anything to Congress,307 of reducing
incentives for legislative manipulation. If losers’ history does not count, there is
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SINCLAIR, supra note 82, at 53-54 (explaining the time pressure in the Senate).
I call this the “Coasian” principle of legislative instability: when there is an electoral
dominance effect, Congress will circumvent even the most carefully wrought and complex
administrative structures. A simple example of this is the passage of mandatory minimum
sentences after the creation of the complex Sentencing Commission scheme. Paul G. Cassell,
Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of Federal Mandatory
Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1044-48 (2004) (criticizing the mandatory minimum
laws passed by Congress as “redundant” of the Sentencing Guidelines).
See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 118-20 (critiquing democracy-forcing interpretive
proposals because they assume coordination among judges).
My position here is not inconsistent with the general claim that there is a large barrier to
communication between Congress and the courts; as a general rule, senators and
representatives have no incentive to pay attention to courts unless their rulings are
politically salient. This is not to say that a repetitive pattern of rulings (or at least a
perception of a repetitive pattern) that has become politically salient cannot have an effect
upon congressional action. See Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox, supra note 12 (arguing that
expansionary progressive readings by courts may inhibit passage of progressive legislation
by Congress). For example, textualism as a theory has been discussed at various points on
the floor of the Senate when it was to a senator’s advantage. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra
note 69, at 988 (reporting the statement by Senator Armstrong that “we should discipline
ourselves to the task of expressing congressional intent in the statute”). So too, if decision
theory were to become commonplace and well-known, it might surface within Congress and
have the salutary side effects mentioned above.
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less incentive for losers to relitigate the issue on the floor of the House or
Senate; if extraneous conference committee report language does not count,
there is less incentive to use committee reports to trump the text passed by
both houses. No one knows how often these things happen, but enforcing
these kinds of rules surely would not increase rule abuse, and might have the
salutary side benefit of strengthening counterincentives to prevent Congress
from violating its own rules.
D. The Democracy Argument
Others may suggest that any recourse to legislative history suffers from a
democracy deficit. Relying on just a few people to represent Congress as a
whole is far less attractive than relying on the whole of Congress that has voted
for the text of the statute. Curiously, no one makes similar arguments in other
venues; no one argues that because we rely upon corporate agents, the rules of
corporate law do not respect markets or the corporate form. But, even if we
were to take the democracy objection at face value, decision theory can accept
and correct for the objection. Take, for example, the case involving conference
reports: assuming a gap in a statute, a reference to the bills that were passed by
the House and Senate is a reference to a more democratic, larger body than the
conference committees that, in Public Citizen, added in the term “utilize,” or, in
Bock Laundry, added in the term “defendant.” Even when a court is relying
upon a smaller body, the drafters of a committee report or an individual
statement of a sponsor, it is not relying on them because of their individual
character, but because it believes that these documents or statements are
representative of a majority’s views. If they are not, then they should not be
relied upon. Finally, in cases where there is an irreducible gap in the statute,
one cannot say that there is in fact a truly democratic alternative to legislative
history—in the case of unforeseen events or even deliberate ambiguity, no
majority ever formed on the interpretive text in question. In such cases, the
courts’ job is to give legal effect to the statute in such a way that is the most
respectful of democracy—and that is to follow democracy’s own rules.
If nothing else, decision theory is more normatively appealing than any
available theory because it is more respectful of legislative supremacy. If Article
I of our Constitution means anything, it signals legislative primacy of place,
which no student of the Constitution or statutory interpretation, textualist or
purposivist, disavows. “Congress is the Constitution’s first branch, with
enumerated, sweeping powers . . . .”308 It is not only the most “potentially
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Rudesill, supra note 6, at 700.
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powerful” legal institution in the country, it is also the institution theoretically
“most accountable to the people.”309 “[F]ederal judges—who have no
constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those
who do.”310 Unfortunately, academic contempt for Congress has deprived
lawyers and judges of the knowledge that would make them not only more
effective citizens but also better informed and disciplined consumers of
Congress’s statutes. As Judge Katzmann explained, it was James Madison’s
vision that a good government not only yields “fidelity to the object of
government, which is the happiness of the people,” but also “a means by which
the object can be best attained.”311
iv. rule-based decision theory versus other positive
political theory approaches
The legislative history question remains the central question dividing the
legal academy’s two principal schools of statutory interpretation: textualism
and purposivism. Although textualists today claim that they are happy to look
at purpose based on the text of the statute,312 and purposivists claim that they
are happy to look at text,313 the one place these schools of thought diverge is
legislative history. Textualists will not look at legislative history; purposivists
will. Most judges are in fact “neither wholly textualists nor purposivists.”314
The theory propounded here—decision theory—is neither wholly textualist nor
purposivist. It argues for the theoretically contrarian position that textualists
must look to legislative history to avoid “picking and choosing” texts and that
purposivists must give up intentionalism to avoid “picking and choosing”
purposes. In other words, textualists must look at legislative history even when
the text appears clear,315 and purposivists must pay more attention to textual
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Id.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
Katzmann, supra note 6, at 694-95 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, 445 (James Madison)
(Cynthia Brantley Johnson ed., 2004)).
SCALIA, supra note 21, at 23 (“To be a textualist in good standing, one need not be too dull to
perceive the broader social purposes that a statute is designed . . . to serve . . . .”).
See Molot, supra note 65, at 36 (“[W]e have all become textualists.”).
Katzmann, supra note 6, at 667.
Salience effects (where the parties focus on one term because it is available) may produce the
appearance that one text is central or plain when there is other text or another meaning of
the text that only appears relevant when looking at the legislative history. On salience bias,
see Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins and
Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
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choices as opposed to reading legislative minds. Both textualists and
purposivists have to understand how Congress really works. Decision theory
tells them both how to understand Congress in the way that lawyers
understand trials, as a series of procedures leading to a final decision.
Some critics may urge that this theory, however attractive, should fail
because it does not reflect “how Congress actually functions.”316 If this theory
is to claim the title of “positivist,” it must convince not only judges and lawyers
but also those who study Congress that it is a better version of theories already
propounded as “positive” political theories. Some scholars, such as Professors
Eskridge and Ferejohn, have argued that lawyers should look at Congress as a
strategic game-player anticipating and responding to other actors’ behavior.317
Other scholars, such as Professors Rodriguez and Weingast, have urged that
Congress produces outcomes as a set of fractured, self-interested individuals
racing to secure the support of the median voter in order to achieve
compromise.318 Decision theory claims to more accurately reflect the internal
workings of Congress, and to do so in a way that is easily translatable to the
actual practice of judging, by focusing on the institutional rules governing
Congress’s decisions.
A. Anticipation-Response Theory
Anticipation-response theory views Congress primarily in relation to other
actors in the overall governmental system: Congress versus the President
versus the judiciary. In an exceedingly important article relying on game
theory, Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn argued that statutory analysis must
consider the anticipated interplay of legislators, judges, and the President.
They contended that “all the parties to the deal operate under assumptions
about how the courts will interpret their bargain. They anticipate the judicial
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AND BIASES 138-39 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982), which notes
that “whenever some aspect of the environment is made disproportionately salient or
‘available’ to the perceiver . . . that aspect is given more weight in causal attribution”; and id.
at 140-41, which describes one form of salience bias as the “false consensus” theory that
one’s own “choices and judgments” are common. See supra notes 116 and 225 (discussing
ways in which cases debated as questions concerning one term turn out to involve more
than one term).
Katzmann, supra note 6, at 645.
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 31, at 523 (describing The Article I, Section 7 Game).
Rodriguez & Weingast, New Perspectives, supra note 12 (describing a positive political theory
of legislative history).
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response as they draft and produce committee reports and floor debates.”319 At
a high level of generality, this model is both important and correct. It predicts
whether the Congress will shift to the political right or the left based on
anticipation about the actions of the President and the judiciary. The problem
is that it does not tell us much of anything about Congress’s internal processes.
Just as a theory of the planets may tell us little about any specific country on
Earth, this theory highlights important interactive effects pitched at a high
level of generality, without giving us much guidance about how specific texts
are created.
At the level of specific text, the theory offered here—decision theory—
disputes a basic assumption upon which the Eskridge-Ferejohn approach
proceeds: that Congress pays a good deal of attention to appellate courts at the
level of particularity necessary to textual interpretation. Although gravity is
surely true, very few people actually pay attention to it as they walk; so, too,
just as it is true that Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn’s institutional
anticipation is a real phenomenon at a high level of generality, there is little
evidence that such anticipation operates in real life at a high level of
particularity. After all, if it did, there would be no need for appellate
interpretation. Full congressional anticipation of judicial interpretations would
mean fully clear statutes. As Professor Eskridge concedes, the assumption of
full information about other players’ actions or preferences (in this case courts’
actions) is “unrealistic” and “simpli[stic].”320 Full information suggests a
picture of congressional omniscience, which is unlikely. It also suggests an
equally unrealistic and cynical picture of strategic behavior: Congress writes
ambiguous statutes knowing that the institution down the line—the courts, or,
more likely, agencies—will bail it out. I would be the first to acknowledge
“structure-induced” ambiguity—that Congress’s internal processes often force
those who would prefer clarity to write ambiguous statutes.321 But it does not
follow from this, as game theory sometimes suggests, that all text-writing in
legislatures is a cynical attempt to manipulate other institutions.
There are good empirical reasons to believe that members of Congress are
indifferent to the vast majority of ordinary statutory interpretation cases in
appellate courts.322 One of the most resilient empirical findings of the political
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ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 69, at 75 (summarizing the argument of Eskridge and Ferejohn’s
The Article I, Section 7 Game).
Id. at 76.
See Nourse, supra note 64, at 1133 (explaining “[s]tructure-induced ambiguity”).
Nourse & Schacter, supra note 27 (empirical study suggesting that Congress does not pay
attention to judicial rulings in any consistent way); see also Katzmann, supra note 6.
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science literature is the “electoral connection”: members do things to get
reelected.323 No one ever lost or won a seat in Congress because voters
campaigned for the man or woman with the most textual bailouts or the
greatest textual clarity.324 If that is right, and the electoral payoff of textual
clarity or bailout ambiguity is small, then the basic empirical assumption of
anticipation-response theory—that there is anticipation at the retail level—may
be too strong.325 As other positive political theorists have argued, “[R]ational
political actors, having many demands on their time, would never devote the
effort necessary to minimize the indeterminacy of statutory language.”326 This
may be true even if I am wrong about my claim that members do not care
terribly much about most retail appellate interpretations; even in cases where
members do care in theory, there is often a significant “lag effect” between
anticipation (legislative passage) and response (judicial ruling) likely to
diminish the force of the effect of the judicial player at the end of the line.327
It is certainly possible to model such effects, for as game theorists
themselves have acknowledged, there can be significant “audience costs” to
making particular policy proposals. As Tim Groseclose, Nolan McCarty, and
James Fearon have shown, the need to signal to third parties can dominate in
some cases, operating as a far stronger influence than the need to anticipate the
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The seminal works are RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR
DISTRICTS (1978); and DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
See also MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
(1977); LEWIS A. FROMAN, JR., CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR CONSTITUENCIES (1963); JOHN W.
KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN’S VOTING DECISIONS (3d ed. 1989); KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL
POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 219-24 (1998); DONALD R. MATTHEWS, U.S.
SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD (1960). The electoral connection is also a staple of PPT
analysis. See, e.g., SHEPSLE, supra note 7, at 113 (“As a first approximation . . . [p]oliticians are
conceived of as single-minded seekers of election.”).
See Nourse, supra note 64, at 1141 (“Can one really imagine citizens protesting on the steps
of the Capitol with signs reading, ‘Vote “No” on Lack of Precision’ . . . ?”).
As PPT analysts acknowledge, “When the stakes are low, uncertainty is high, and individual
choices are of little consequence to the chooser, then inconsistencies are likely to be
common.” SHEPSLE, supra note 7, at 28. To be fair, Professor Eskridge and his coauthors
acknowledge that “[t]he structure of institutions makes a difference in the way people
interact.” ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 69, at 76. The question remains whether the Article I,
Section 7 model, see id. at 77-80, accurately reflects the proper institutional rules as they
apply to legislative history. Of course, Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn might argue that
they are not seeking to provide a theory of legislative history. But see Ferejohn & Weingast,
supra note 71 (offering a positive theory of statutory interpretation).
McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 12, at 715.
Nourse, supra note 64, at 1163.
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institution down the line.328 For example, as a general rule, Congress will not
go to the trouble of passing bills that it knows the President will veto, a general
positive prediction gleaned from the Eskridge-Ferejohn approach. But in some
cases Congress does: for example, in 1992, Congress passed the Family and
Medical Leave Act, even though it was well known that President Bush was
going to veto it.329 Proponents wanted to make the bill an issue in an election
year: that is, the electoral connection dominated and explained the institutional
behavior. Similarly, the electoral connection may explain congressional
indifference to the “bailout effect”: because of the lag between congressional
enactment and judicial enforcement, electoral cycles may make judicial
enforcement irrelevant to the individual legislator.330 No one was ever ousted
from a seat because his or her electoral opponent claimed he or she wrote an
unclear bill, particularly one that had never reached a court or agency.
Some would say that anticipation is neutral as to whether the player down
the line reacts negatively or positively—that even a failure to act based on
anticipation (for instance, the veto of a popular bill) involves anticipation. But
even if one describes inaction as action, there remains a third possibility at odds
with any claim of positive or negative “anticipation”: indifference. We know
Congress acts in ways apparently indifferent to judicial or executive action: it
passes bills that will be vetoed,331 bills that are deliberately ambiguous,332 bills
for symbolic purposes.333 We know that the House passes bills it knows (or at
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See Tim Groseclose & Nolan McCarty, The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience,
45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 100, 101 (2001) (“Almost all models of bargaining ignore the possibility
that the two primary negotiators want to send signals to a third party.”); see also James D.
Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes, 88 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 577 (1994) (discussing vertical and horizontal considerations of democratic states
conducting foreign policy).
Groseclose & McCarty, supra note 328, at 100.
See Nourse, supra note 64, at 1163 (noting this lag effect).
See, e.g., Groseclose & McCarty, supra note 328, at 100 (discussing the Family and Medical
Leave Act).
See Nourse, supra note 64, at 1133 (explaining “structure-induced ambiguity”). For an
analogous but different view of “purposeful” ambiguity, see Jorgensen & Shepsle, supra note
31, at 45.
See SINCLAIR, supra note 82, at 77 (“To expedite the legislative process on the Senate floor, a
floor manager will often agree to accept many pending amendments, either as is or with
some negotiated changes, and roll them into a big ‘manager’s amendment’ that the floor
manager then offers. After a number of grueling days on the floor, the manager may be
willing to accept ‘just about anything,’ staff report (only half-jokingly). Some of these
amendments, everyone knows, will be dropped in conference. Even so, senators are able to
claim credit for an amendment passing the Senate.”).

a decision theory of statutory interpretation

least should know) will fail in the Senate.334 All of this suggests that if one
wants to refine the concept of anticipation and predict variations in negative
anticipation and/or indifference, one must consider the possibility of an
“electoral dominance”335 effect (the electoral connection produces negative or
indifferent anticipation). If the electoral dominance336 effect is true, then one
can predict variation in institutional anticipation based on electoral payoff:
members will not care about most retail statutory interpretation decisions for
which there is no electoral payoff, but will care most where wholesale trends or
particular legislation is most salient to the electorate.
The game theorist may well claim that he or she is not offering a theory for
interpreting legislative history, simply a prediction of policy outcomes. Indeed,
on the latter score, the Ferejohn-Eskridge thesis is quite persuasive at a
wholesale level. At a retail, textual level, however, one wonders whether it
provides the fine-grained tools offered by a rule-based decision theory or
whether it can be employed by judges in ways consistent with their
constitutional mission, which rejects policymaking in favor of close textual
analysis.
B. Signaling Theory
Signaling theory offers a more fine-grained analysis and greater ability to
address textual choice. In a series of path-breaking articles, Professors
Rodriguez and Weingast have argued for an approach that urges judges to
distinguish between reliable and unreliable legislative history. Reliable history
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See SINCLAIR, supra note 82, at 160-61 (discussing the Contract with America, which any
moderately informed observer of the Congress would probably have known could not have
been passed in the Senate because of a potential filibuster).
A “dominant” effect in game theory is an alternative that beats out all available alternatives.
PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 115-16
(2003).
One caveat to this “electoral dominance” hypothesis should be noted: to say that the
electoral payoff dominates anticipation at the “retail level,” on individual pieces of
legislation, is not a claim intended to impugn game theory at a more general or “wholesale
level.” Occasionally, members may give speeches on “legislative interpretation,” but the
electoral dominance thesis predicts that they are likely to react only to trends in legislative
interpretation when they are translated into public perceptions of judicial interpretation, or
when the trend matters to a particular political outcome. If, for example, the people believe
that courts are too “liberal,” or “conservative,” in general, this may translate into a dominant
anticipation effect upon the legislative process at the wholesale level, but only, as the
electoral dominance thesis predicts, because this is a popular conception likely to yield
electoral payoff. See Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox, supra note 12, at 1209 (arguing that a
general trend may translate into anticipation).
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is history necessary to persuade a “moderate coalition” to adopt particular
language. A moderate voting coalition is the critical voting bloc necessary to
support a statute. Moderates are to be distinguished from majority advocates
who are likely to be overly enthusiastic about the law’s purposes, and minority
objectors who are likely to be overly pessimistic. The conscientious judge,
under signaling theory, looks for “costly signals”—statements by the majority
necessary to “signal” the real meaning of the law to the moderate coalition—
and avoids “cheap talk,” statements that are likely to be exaggerated because
the speaker pays no cost in persuading the moderate coalition.337
Decision theory338 does not dispute the existence of voting blocs or the
importance of compromise in legislating, but urges that the temporal point of
compromise in the overall institutional process is more important than the
identity of those who compromised.339 Signaling theorists have, from the
beginning, acknowledged the power of the rules in analyzing legislative
history.340 They have missed an opportunity, however, in failing to emphasize
their comparative advantage vis-à-vis lawyers—knowledge of the rules. For
example, positive political theorists focused on signaling do not stress the rules
as much as they might. Although they acknowledge that the legislative process
is sequential, they do not emphasize the obvious implication of that theory—
reverse sequentialism: that later textual decisions trump earlier ones.341
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McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 12, at 706-07.
In technical terms, decision theory shifts from a welfarist preference-aggregation model to
one that assumes that institutional rules and sequential priority procedures perform
important preference-aggregation functions. See LIST & PETTIT, supra note 30, at 58 (arguing
that “[a]n aggregation function such as a premise-based or sequential priority procedure
enables a group not only to form rational intentional attitudes but also to do so in a way that
collectivizes reason”); see also id. at 72 (arguing that a “sequential priority procedure” with
“distributed premised-based procedures” can yield “robust group rationality”); id. at 71
(defining “distributed premised-based procedure” as “the attitudes of some subgroup—the
relevant specialists” that determine the “group attitude on that premise”). Decision theory
further assumes that because congressional sequential rules and subgroup delegations are
internal to the congressional process, they are more reliable aggregators than are external
measures such as generalized measures of voting behavior or ideological scores (typically
used in PPT).
For examples of focus on the identity of the compromisers, see Rodriguez & Weingast, New
Perspectives, supra note 12, at 1461-62, which uses Americans for Democratic Action scores;
and id. at 1507, where the authors use the votes on an amendment to hypothesize a key
coalition.
McNollgast, Intent, supra note 12, at 10.
See, e.g., McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 12, at 721 (stating that the moderate
coalition is a “union of . . . actors” at all points in the process and thus not distinguishing
between key institutional moments of compromise (cloture and conference committee) and
implying that all points in the process have the same value).
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Most importantly, signaling theory has failed to use the rules to focus on
textual decisions rather than voting coalitions. Firsthand empirical accounts of
the legislative process acknowledge the ad hoc nature of the motivating factors
explaining any member’s vote, however pivotal. For example, during the
debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, there was an earthquake in Alaska, and
President Johnson loaned the Alaska senators Air Force Two so that they could
return to the state, helping to ensure the Alaska senators’ votes for cloture.342
Similarly, one of the last votes to obtain cloture on the 1964 Act was gained by
a call to a moderate senator from the Archbishop of Dubuque, Iowa—the
senator was a former Notre Dame law professor.343
Knowing the “real” moderate coalition ex post is likely to be impossible
given that deals involve not only life’s vagaries, but cross-statute compromises
(“I will give you the Violence Against Women Act if you cut the federal
workforce”)—none of which will ever appear on the legislative record because
they take place in hideaways and cloakrooms. If this is the deal that judges
must find, it cannot be found in the congressional record, and it cannot be
found by positive political theorists.344 Far more importantly, the airplane and
the phone call tell us little about the meaning of section 703(j) or any of the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act text about which judges care.
The good news is that even if this is true of the real deal, the Constitution
and the rules force deals into text—Congress must pass one law to send to the
President.345 Once Senators exit the cloakroom, they must write their
compromise in language, and they must do it according to the rules. As Keith
Krehbiel has made clear, the cloture rule is central to understanding pivotal
politics.346 Not surprisingly, the substitute bill prior to cloture reveals
significant textual compromises. So, too, conference committees are explicitly
constructed to resolve conflicts between the House and the Senate and to make
compromises necessary to achieve one text. In the end, it is the rules creating
these institutions of compromise (as opposed to the compromising members
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ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 69, at 20.
WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 180, at 190-91.
See, e.g., McNollgast, Intent, supra note 12 (defending and using the notion of intent).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
The reason the cloture rule is pivotal (and more pivotal than, say, the rules produced by the
Rules Committee in the House) is that the Bicameralism Clause requires the House and
Senate to agree and that, with tougher rules allowing a minority to block legislation, the
Senate gains power relative to the House, which it is unlikely to give up. KREHBIEL, supra
note 323, at 233 (arguing that the filibuster is pivotal and a more powerful explanation than
rules granting parliamentary advantages); SINCLAIR, supra note 82, at 50 (“[I]n the House
the majority can always prevail; in the Senate minorities can often block majorities.”).
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or their idiosyncratic motives) that are crucial in understanding where to find
textual compromises. A pivotal decision on a text is different from a pivotal
member on any vote.347 The rules show us points of decision where
compromises are almost surely to be made about text, without having to
identify particular moderate coalitions or members.348
As Miriam Jorgensen and Kenneth Shepsle long ago worried, identifying
the moderate coalition may be quite difficult.349 In fact, the rules may matter a
good deal in making such a determination. A moderate member on a
committee is not a necessarily a moderate member on cloture, and a moderate
member on cloture is not necessarily a moderate member in conference
committee.350 As Shepsle argued in the context of committees, the “best deal”
that can be cut “depends upon the procedural rules for amendments.”351 For
example, if one did not know the rules and incentives, one might assume that
anyone offering a post-cloture amendment is a legitimate “moderate” seeking
true compromise rather than an opponent opportunistically seeking to undo
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Even before a bill is brought up, a senator may inform his or her party leader of an intention
to object, known as a “hold.” “Especially when floor time is short—before a recess or near
the end of the session,” the power of the hold increases and “[a]s time becomes scarcer, a
hold increasingly becomes a veto.” SINCLAIR, supra note 82, at 62. “Holds are frequent, and
placing them has become standard operating procedure in the Senate.” Id. at 61. They are
not part of Senate rules, but an informal custom: “What gives holds their bite is the implicit
or explicit threat to filibuster the motion to proceed.” Id.
By contrast, see the complex analysis of McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 12, at 721-22.
See also id. at 721 (“The influence of a member of the enacting coalition depends on three
things: the ability of the member to control the agenda of the legislature, the relative
amount of information about proposed alternatives and the preferences of others possessed
by the member, and the details of the differences in policy objectives among members.”).
Jorgensen & Shepsle, supra note 31, at 47 (wondering whether “a legislator who speaks and
votes against an amendment that ultimately passes, but who supports the amended
legislation in the vote on final passage,” should “be considered part of the enacting
coalition”); see also id. (“For example, a vote for an amendment, intended to kill a bill but
failing to do so even though the amendment passes, may mistakenly qualify an individual as
part of the enacting coalition . . . .”); id. at 49 (“[W]e remain skeptical that the chasm of
incoherence that haunts coalitions, and distinguishes them from individual decisionmakers,
can be completely bridged.”). Decision theory avoids this “identify the coalition” problem
by focusing on text.
SHEPSLE, supra note 7, at 99 (“Who the median is . . . depends upon who the participants in
the group are.”); see id. at 124 (“Just as majority preferences in the entire legislature are
identical to the preferences of the committee’s median voter, majority preferences inside a
committee are a copy of the preferences of the committee’s median member.”).
Id. at 137.
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the substitute’s compromise.352 The important point is to look at the particular
text, not to assume an inevitable empirical truth based on a member’s voting
record or ideological scores.
It is in the text that one can find the best evidence as to whether the
amendment is a real or false compromise. Does it repeat a prior amendment?
Does it address an issue previously addressed in the substitute text introduced
to induce cloture? With any textual change, it will be far more difficult to
ascertain the moderate coalition than it will be to tell whether the text changed
from proposal A to proposal B, and for lawyers, it is the text that counts. As
Jerry Mashaw has argued, the early game theory literature asserted judges’ role
in heroic terms that could never be implemented.353 Positive political theorists,
unlike lawyers or legal academics, know Congress’s rules and depend on them
in conducting their analyses; they should step back a moment and consider
that educating lawyers about the rules would, in fact, represent a significant
contribution to lawyerly practice by simplifying their model for use in the real
world of appellate judging. The rules themselves have limits; they will not
solve every case, and when one is left with raw legislative debate, signaling
theory is right to try to sift the wheat from the chaff by searching for “costly
actions” rather than “cheap talk.”354
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On opportunistic incentives and behavior, see McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 12, at
717.
MASHAW, supra note 30, at 99 (“If McNollgast means to suggest that legislative history is
reliable only when it can be deployed in this sophisticated fashion . . . , they may have
offered judges and administrators a tool that they cannot use.”). McNollgast originally
claimed, as a theoretical matter, that Bayesian analysis proved why simple status quo
textualism could not be a rational result: rejecting more information (in the form of
legislative history) to prefer the status quo was likely to be irrational. See McNollgast, Intent,
supra note 12, at 23-35. This theoretical argument against textualism was not intended, in my
view, to be an injunction to judges to use various forms of Bayesian analysis. To the extent
that judges are being asked to find moderate coalitions, they are being asked to engage
either in a fraud (statutes do not come with signs that any particular text is a “moderating”
text) or in an analysis of voting patterns for which they are ill equipped.
In this piece, I do not attempt to offer a positive theory of a “costly” action, but rather suggest
that any such theory must view a costly action as one in the context of the rules and, as
existing signaling theory in part suggests, in terms of whether one is advocating for or
against the bill. So, for example, admissions against interest—statements against an
advocate’s or opponent’s own position—are more reliable than statements supporting
one’s own position.
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conclusion
Ever since Henry Hart and Albert Sacks offered their theory of legal
process, scholars have been trying to either reject or improve upon it. Hart and
Sacks caused a revolution by pushing scholars away from the common law and
courts by introducing elements of legal analysis in considering legislation and
administration. Unfortunately, that movement suffered from a tendency to
imagine legislators and administrators in the image of judges. The judiciary
does not exist at the center of the constitutional universe. If nothing else, a
generation of work in political science has provided theories supported by
empirical data showing that this is a rather narrow and unrealistic view. It is
time that we have a minor Copernican revolution. It is time to reconsider the
view that courts are the center of the constitutional universe. We must instead
consider a new model of our “constitution entire” that is as knowledgeable
about Congress’s processes as those of courts or other legal institutions.
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